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Mechanics' Liens
DOUGLAS M. HALSEY* AND ROBERT TISCHENKEL**
In 1977 and 1978 the Florida Legislature made extensive
amendments to the Mechanics' Lien Law. The statute, however,
remains intricate and elusive for builder, lawyer and lienor alike.
The authors review the amendments and case law of the past two
years and offer suggestions on how to avoid the many pitfalls of
the statute. In addition, the article contains a section devoted to
the equitable lien.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There can be no more confusing statute in Florida than the
one on liens under Chapter 713. The frequent impracticality of
its application in the field, coupled with ill conceived, confusing
patchwork amendments, all topped off by conflicting appellate
decisions, have all combined to make life miserable for judges,
lawyers, legislators and the vitally affected construction and
lending industries.'
The McDonalds of Jacksonville had to pay twice for their new
aluminum siding. Had they known what lay ahead, they might have
chosen to live with the rotted wood on the exterior of their home for
another year. The McDonalds had hired "Mr. Exteriors" to replace
the wood with aluminum which was to be bought'on credit from a
wholesale dealer by "Mr. Exteriors." The work was completed dur-
ing the first week of August, 1976, whereupon the McDonalds paid
"Mr. Exteriors" in full. A substantial portion of the sum was for
payment of the debt to the wholesaler. "Mr. Exteriors" never paid
the wholesaler.
On August 12, 1976, the wholesaler sent the McDonalds a no-
tice to owner pursuant to section 713.06(2)(a) of the Mechanics'
Lien Law.2 On October 20, 1976, the McDonalds received a copy of
the wholesaler's recorded claim of lien pursuant to section 713.08.1
About one and one-half years later, the District Court of Appeal,
1. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis Water & Waste Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 225, 225
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (Letts, J.).
2. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1975) (current version at id. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977)).
In 1977, the Florida Legislature amended numerous sections of chapter 713 of the Florida
Statutes. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353. These changes became effective on July 1, 1978. Id. §
18. Because they did not take effect immediately, these changes were codified in the notes
following the main text of the amended sections of the Florida Statutes (1977). For the
convenience of the reader, citations to these amended sections will be indicated by the
notation "n.l."
3. FLA. STAT. § 713.08 (1975) (current version at id. § 713.08 & n.1 (1977)).
[Vol. 33:1103
MECHANICS' LIENS
First Distict, in Adams v. McDonald,' required the McDonalds to
pay the wholesaler for the aluminum siding.
The court's ruling was founded upon the failure of the McDon-
aids to file a notice of commencement5 and to obtain a contractor's
affidavit' from "Mr. Exteriors." 7 Without filing the notice of com-
mencement, the McDonalds could not "properly" pay their contrac-
tor." They could have avoided improper payments by obtaining a
contractor's affidavit to learn of any unpaid materialmen1 Having
failed to do so, the McDonalds' payments to "Mr. Exteriors" did not
exist in the eyes of the court.1
The double payment in Adams illustrates a pitfall of noncom-
pliance with the Mechanics' Lien Law. The McDonalds .had not
been aware of their responsibility to comply with the statute. This
prompted the First District to suggest that the legislature amend
the statute so that a homeowner need not unwittingly incur the
statute's wrath." The legislature responded by amending section
713.02(5) of the Florida Statutes to exempt improvements for which
the contract price is $2,500 or less from liens of parties not in privity
with the owner.' 2 While this provision spares the, homeowner from
entangling himself in the Mechanics' Lien Law for a simple home
addition, it may have an adverse effect upon subcontractors who
deal with either the homeowner or the professionI. A homeowner
can now more easily reject the subcontractor's work, knowing that
his property cannot be reached by a lien. Also, contractors could
insulate the owner from liens by hiring different subcontractors to
perform the same task so that no contract exceeds $2,500.
4. Adams v. McDonald, 356 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
5. FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1) (1975) (current version at id. § 713.13(1) & n.1 (1977)).
6. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1975) (current version at § 713.06(3)(d)(1) n.1 (1977)).
7. 356 So. 2d at 866.
8. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(a) (1975).
9. If the McDonalds had received a contractor's affidavit which represented that all
lienors had been paid, they might have had some protection against an omission by the
contractor. Section 713.06(3)(d)(4) suggests that the owner may "rely" upon the contractor's
affidavit if a lienor who is not identified in the affidavit has not sent timely notice to the
owner. The owner should, however, discover and pay those lienors who have given proper
notice but were omitted from the affidavit. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(4) (1975) (current
version at id. § 713.06(3)(d)(4) n.1 (1977)). In Adams, the notice to owner was not sent until
after the contractor had been paid. If "Mr. Exteriors" had given a false affidavit to the
McDonalds, then the wholesaler would have lost on its suit to foreclose its lien under §
713.06(2)(a) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977)).
10. The court stated, "an owner pays the contractor at his peril when he does not file
the notice of commencement or demand and receive from the contractor the affidavit ....
356 So. 2d at 866-67.
11. 356 So. 2d at 866.
12. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-397, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 713.02(5) (Supp. 1978)).
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Because of the interrelated provisions in the statute, an amend-
ment intended to rectify one problem invariably raises another.
Thus, the statute has become so complex for members of the con-
struction industry and their attorneys that even those persons aware
of the problems find their attempts at compliance to be unsatisfac-
tory. This article will summarize recent case law and statutory
amendments in an effort to provide practitioners with a guide to the
intricacies of the law.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF A LIEN
A. Notice to Owner
1. THE PRIVITY CONCEPT
All lienors, except laborers, 3 who are not in privity with the
owner must serve notice upon the owner as a prerequisite to the
perfection of the lien.' Those lienors who are in privity with the
owner may have a lien without serving a notice upon the owner. 5 A
lienor not in privity who furnishes labor, services or materials and
thereafter comes into privity with the owner is entitled to a lien for
his work done after privity has been established."0 Therefore, if a
nonprivity lienor fails to serve proper notice, he may partially pro-
tect his interest'by alleging and proving facts which establish the
later existence of privity. 7
13. The notice to owner protects the owner from unanticipated liens. Laborers are ex-
cluded from this notice requirement because their liens are not apt to be burdensome to the
owner. They will not work for long periods without pay and consequently will not have a large
hidden claim. See Morgan v. Goodwin, 355 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In Morgan,
a subcontractor who failed to provide notice to the owner argued that he was a laborer by
virtue of the natue of his work. The subcontractor was hired to level and grade the owner's
land. He was paid by the hour, operated the heavy machinery and supervised only a few
workers. However, he also furnished materials to the site: his own tractor and fuel for all the
tractors. The statute's definition of laborer excludes one who furnishes materials, even when
the materials are not incorporated into the improvement. FLA. STAT. § 713.01(6), (9) (1977).
Thus, the court held that he more aptly fit the definition of subcontractor and thereby lost
his right to claim a lien by not giving notice to the owner. 355 So. 2d at 219. For a further
discussion of Morgan, see note 23 infra.
14. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977). See also 2 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 1096 (1977). Professionals, such as architects and engineers, need never serve
a notice to owner. FLA. STAT. § 713.03(3) n.1 (1977).
15. FLA. STAT. § 713.05 n.1 (1977).
16. Id.
17. Privity under the Mechanics' Lien Law need not be purely contractual in nature.
Privity may be established by showing the owner's knowledge of and consent to the lienor's
activities, combined with the owner's express or implied assumption of a contractual obliga-
tion. Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1952); Note, Lien Rights and Construc-
tion Lending: Responsibilities and Liabilities in Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 411, 414-15 (1977).
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In Tompkins Land Co. v. Edge,18 a subcontractor was hired to
install water and sewer lines. When his contractor failed to pay him,
he sent an untimely notice to the owner and filed a claim of lien.
At trial, the subcontractor contended that the notice to owner was
unnecessary as he had privity with the owner. The privity allegedly
developed when the owner told the subcontractor that he had in-
stalled a fire hydrant in the wrong place, and it would have to be
relocated. In reversing a finding of privity below, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, determined that a single encounter be-
tween the subcontractor and the owner was insufficient at law to
create privity." The court recited the factors needed to create priv-
ity.20 The subcontractor should routinely communicate with the
owner; the owner's knowledge of the subcontractor must lead to the
owners express or implied assumption of contractual obligation.2
Furthermore, as the subcontractor's relationship with the owner
grows or intensifies, its dealings with the general contractor should
wane." Indeed, in establishing privity with the owner, it is best if
the subcontractor has no dealings or agreements with the contrac-
tor.
The Mechanics' Lien Law exempts a* narrow class of lienors
from the general privity requirement. Under section 713.04 of the
Florida Statutes, where a lienor performs services :op furnishes mate-
rials for a subdivision improvement, he is entitled to a lien without
first giving the owner notice. 3 In American Fire & Casualty v. Davis
Water & Waste Industries, Inc., '2 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, noted that section 713.04 is silent as to whether
notice to owner is required. 25 The court held that notice to owner is
18. 341 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 207 (citing Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1952)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. FA. STAT. § 713.04 (1977). This provision describes a subdivision improvement as,
inter alia:
grading, leveling, excavating and filling of land . . . the grading and paving of
streets, curbs and sidewalks, the construction of ditches and other area drainage
facilities, and the laying of pipes and conduits for water, gas, electric, sewage and
drainage purposes, and construction of canals, and shall also include the altering,
repairing and redoing of all said things.
Id.
In Morgan v. Goodwin, 355 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the subcontractor lost in his
bid for a claim of lien because he failed to give notice to the owner pursuant to FLA. STAT. §
713.06(2)(a) (1975). The subcontractor's work was the leveling and grading of land. Had the
subcontractor alleged he was a subdivision improver under § 713.04, he probably could have
prevailed.
24. 358 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
25. Id. at 226.
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not necessary because the obligations of a subcontractor under sec-
tion 713.04 are separate and distinct from those under section
713.06(2)(a)."
2. ELEMENTS OF THE NOTICE TO OWNER
The notice to owner should set forth the lienor's name and
address and must provide a sufficient description of the real prop-
erty involved. The notice should also delineate the services or mate-
rials furnished or to be furnished." Notice must be served before
commencing or not later than forty-five days from commencing to
furnish services or materials.
2
A serious misdescription of the property in a supplier's notice
to owner caused the supplier to lose its claim of lien in Continental
Casualty Co. v. Associated Plastics, Inc.21 In Continental, the sup-
plier described and gave the address of the adjacent property. As a
result, the owner misfiled the notice in his own records and when
the owner sold the property, the new owner had no knowledge of the
notice until the claim of lien was filed. The supplier argued as
precedent a case in which one small aspect of a street address mis-
takenly appeared in the notice." In that case, it was suggested that
a minor error was not fatal. The error, however, was fatal to the
supplier's claim of lien in Continental because of the extent and
effect of the misdescription.31 Nevertheless, a question is raised by
the new strict compliance guidelines of the Mechanics' Lien Law as
26. Id. The court also noted that its decision conflicts with Booth v. Lombardi, Inc., 309
So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Booth is too terse an opinion to enable one to discern whether
the court deemed the lienor's activities as falling outside of those described in § 713.04, or
whether the silence of § 713.04 as to notice to owner directs adherence to § 713.06(2)(a).
Recognizing this conflict, the court in American Fire certified the as yet unanswered
question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 358 So. 2d at 226. Meanwhile, the District Court
of Appeal, First District, has followed the American Fire holding. Baumgartner Constr. Co.
v. Harrell, 364 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
27. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977).
28. Id. Section 713.06(2)(a) goes on to state that the notice must be served "in any event
before the date of furnishing the [contractor's] affidavit . ..or abandonment, whichever
shall occur fnst." Id. This indicates that the lienor's 45-day period can be abbreviated if the
contractor abandons the project. The lienor can best protect himself by filing his notice to
owner immediately. A notice to owner can be given after a job is completed if it is timely
and if the contractor has failed to furnish his affidavit pursuant to § 713.06(3)(d)(1). Such
was the case in Adams v. McDonald, 356 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see text accompany-
ing notes 4-9 supra.
29. 347 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
30. Id. at 824. The case was Adobe Brick & Supply Co. v. Centex-Winston Corp., 270
So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
31. In Adobe Brick, the mistaken address as given in the notice was "250 N.E. 174th
Street." The correct address was "250 of 174th Street." 270 So. 2d at 757.
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to whether a minor misdescription may be disregarded. 3
A strict compliance standard may have caused another lien
claim to perish in Marson v. Com isky.33 The lienor in Marson identi-
fied himself as an individual in the notice to owner. In actuality, he
supplied services and materials through a corporation which he
owned with his wife. The lien claim was ruled defective, and a
denial of summary judgment was reversed and remanded.3'
3. 1977 AMENDMENTS
The 1977 amendment to section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes has added a further notice obligation for certain classes of
lienors. A subsubcontractor (or a materialman to a subcontractor)
must serve a copy of the notice to owner upon the contractor. Failure
to serve this copy will result in loss of the right to claim a lien.3
Furthermore, a materialman to a subcontractor must serve a copy
of the notice to owner upon the subcontractor or the subsubcon-
tractor as a prerequisite to perfection of his lien. With this amend-
ment, the closest party not in privity with the lienor is informed of
the lienor's presence and of his potential resort to the statute so that
double payment may be avoided.
4. SERVICE OF NOTICE
Notice may be served as in the manner of serving process, i.e.,
by actual delivery, by registered or certified mail, or if none of the
above is feasible, then by posting at the site. In Bowen v. Merlo,5
service by regular mail was deemed to be permissible especially
since the owner did receive the notice. The court based its holding
upon a comparison of service by regular mail with actual delivery
under section 713.18(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes." The issue of
what constituted effective service was again raised in S & S Air
Conditioning Co. v. Cantor,4 where the notice to owner was sent to
the owners' attorney. The attorney had acted on behalf of the out-
32. The court 'in Adobe Brick based its holding on a liberal reading of the Mechanics'
Lien Law. The court determined that liberal construction was necessary both to protect
materialmen and laborers and to carry out the remedial intent of the statute. Id. at 758. But
see FLA. STAT. § 713.37 (1977).
33. 341 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
34. Id. at 1040-41.
35. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977)).
36. Id.
37. FLA. STAT. § 713.18 (1977).
38. 353 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Ist DCA 1978) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 668-69.
40. 343 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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of-state owners in the purchase of the land; hence, the attorney's
name and address appeared on the recorded deed at a post office
address in care of the owners. 1 The court held that service was
actually made on the owners as the notice was presumably mailed
to them.4" This is to be distinguished from a situation in which the
notice is mailed to the wrong person-e.g., an employee of a corpo-
ration rather than an officer.4
B. Claim of Lien
1. PERFECTION OF THE LIEN
To perfect a lien and establish its priority, the lienor must
record a claim of lien." The statute lists the contents of the claim
of lien" and states that the lien is sufficient if the claim substan-
tially adheres to the form for a claim of lien given in the statute."
In Mid-State Contractors, Inc. v. Halo Development Corp.," the
lienor failed to follow the statutorily suggested claim of lien form in
all respects. The lienor stated that the amount remaining to be paid
was "between $30,000 and/or $56,000."" After a motion to dismiss
was granted, the lienor amended its complaint to state that $39,200
was owed. Nevertheless, the trial court again granted the motion to
dismiss due to the failure of the lienor to include the specific amount
remaining unpaid in his original claim of lien."9
41. Id. at 924.
42. Id. at 926.
43. Id. When the owner designates a person in addition to himself to receive a copy of
the notice, the lienor should comply, but failure to comply will not invalidate an otherwise
valid lien. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(b) (1977).
44. FLA. STAT. § 713.08(1) & n.1 (1977). After recordation the lienor has 15 days to serve
the claim of lien. Id. § 713.08(4)(c) n.1.
45. The claim of lien should state the name of the lienor and the address where notices
or process may be served on him; the name of the person who contracted with or employed
the lienor; the labor, services or materials the lienor provided as well as the contract price or
value thereof; a description of the real property; the name of the owner; the time when the
lienor began and also last provided the service, labor or materials; the amount unpaid the
lienor; and, for a person not in privity with the owner, the date and method of service on the
owner. Id. §713.08 & n.1. Section 713.08(1)(h) also requires that if the person claiming the
lien is not in privity with the contractor or subcontractor, he must include in his claim of
lien the method of service and a copy of the notice on that contractor or subcontractor. Id. §
713.08(1)(h) n.1.
46. Id. § 713.08(3) (1977).
47. 342 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
48. Id. at 1079. In Mid-State, the court was construing FLA. STAT. § 713.08(1)(g) (1975),
which has not since been amended. That provision requires the claim of lien to state "[tihe
amount unpaid the lienor for such labor or services or materials." 342 So. 2d at 1079 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 713.08(1)(g) (1975)).
49. 342 So. 2d at 1079.
[Vol. 33:11031110
MECHANICS' LIENS
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed on the
ground that the claim of lien had "substantially" adhered to the
statute under the test provided by section 713.08(3) of the Florida
Statutes. 0 Furthermore, pursuant to section 713.08(4)(a) of the
Florida Statutes, the court may within its discretion overlook any
error in the claim if the error has not produced an adverse effect."
Halo had not proven any adverse effect and Mid-State had eventu-
ally pinpointed the exact amount due before an adverse effect could
develop.5"
By implication, Mid-State requires the lienor to specify the
amount which remains unpaid. It appears that the court's sympa-
thy toward the lienor's approximation of the amount unpaid in the
original claim was due to the later specification in the amended
complaint. This liberal treatment does not contravene the general
policy of strict construction of the statute because of tolerance for
the lienor which is built into sections 713.08(3) and 713.08(4)(a). "
The claim of lien may be recorded at any time during the course
of work and not later than ninety days after the final furnishing of
labor, materials or services.54 In Cross State Development v. Indepco
Construction Co.,55 a lienor argued that the ninety-day period
should begin to run from the day it removed its machinery from the
job site.5 The lienor had last furnished services more than ninety
days prior to recording the lien but it had left unused machinery at
the site. The claim of lien was filed within ninety days of the re-
moval of the machinery. The court concluded that the storage of
machinery is not tantamount to the furnishing of labor or services,
and therefore the ninety-day period will begin to run when the lienor
actually terminates work. 7
50. Id. at 1079-80.
51. Id. at 1080-81.
52. Id. at 1080. As in Continental Cas. Co. v. Associated Plastics, Inc., 347 So. 2d 822
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and Adobe Brick & Supply Co. v. Centex-Winston Corp., 270 So. 2d 755
(Fla. 3d DCA 1972), discussed notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra, the court's view of
the seriousness of the error will probably be the dispositive factor in a determination of
prejudice.
53. Whether a decision concerning a misdescription in the notice to owner could serve
as precedent for a misdescription in the claim of lien is open for debate.
54. FLA. STAT. § 713.08(5) (1977). When the contractor defaults the lienor must file his
claim of lien within 90 days of the default if the default occurred before the lienor completed
his work at the site. Id.
55. 346 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
56. Id. at 128.
57. Id.
1979]
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2. CLAIM OF LIEN FORM
A word of caution is in order for the practitioner who would rely
upon the suggested claim of lien form in the statute without consult-
ing the actual provisions of the statute. The suggested form was not
changed to conform with the 1977 amendments. 8
3. WAIVER OF LIEN
A lien may be waived before or after services or materials have
been furnished." In First Atlantic Building Corp. v. Neubauer Con-
struction Co., 0 the contract between owner and contractor con-
tained language which was alleged to constitute a lien waiver.,' The
contract provided that the "Contractor will save and keep the build-
ing or buildings referred to in this Agreement and the lands upon
which they are situated free from all Mechanic's Liens . . .by rea-
son of his work or of any materials or other things used by him
therein." 2 The court found the clause to be ambiguous and resolved
the ambiguity against waiver."
C. Notice of Commencement
1. ELEMENTS OF A NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT
The owner's notice of commencement serves two purposes.
First, only after the notice of commencement has been recorded may
the owner make proper payments. All payments made prior to no-
tice are deemed not to exist for lien purposes, and the owner remains
liable to the lien claimant for those payments." Second, the date of
58. Reliance upon the form alone fails to reveal the amendments to FLA. STAT. §§
713.08(1)(h), (2) (1977).
Section 713.08(1)(h) requires recordation of the date and method of service of notice to
the owner whenever a lien is claimed by a person not in privity with the owner. Section
713.08(2) has since added the lienor's attorney to the class of those who may sign a claim of
lien.
59. Id. § 713.20(2). A laborer, however, may only waive his lien to the extent of labor
performed at the time of waiver. Id.
60. 352 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
61. Id. at 105.
62. Id.
63. Id. The rule that lien waivers must be specifically stated should also apply to partial
waivers of lien for amount due, services or labor performed, or as to any part of the real
property involved, as provided by FLA. STAT. § 713.20(3) (1977). A partial waiver is customary
when progress payments are being made. When a false partial waiver is executed which leads
the owner to believe that a payment has been made, the lien claimant will be equitably
estopped from enforcing his lien. Continental Cas. Co. v. Associated Plastics, Inc., 347 So.
2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
64. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(a) (1977); 2 R. Bovaa, supra note 14, at 1089.
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recording of the notice acts as the effective date of the lien. When-
ever filed, the lien will attach and take priority as of the date the
notice was recorded.6 5
In addition to recording the notice of commencement, the
owner must also post the notice at the improvement site." Work on
the improvement must start within thirty days after recording or the
notice of commencement will become void." The notice, however,
is not needed for subdivision improvements made pursuant to sec-
tion 713.04."
The obligation to provide the notice of commencement is solely
the burden of the owner." In Maclntyre v. Green's Pool Service,
Inc.,10 a homeowner contracted with an architect for a remodeling
job. The contract was a standard A.I.A. form, with modifications
that were immaterial to the lawsuit. After the general contractor
abandoned the job, leaving behind an army of unpaid subcontrac-
tom, the owner responded to a mechanic's lien form by filing a third-
party complaint against the architect in negligence. Among the acts
of negligence alleged was a failure to provide the notice of com-
mencement. The court held that there was no showing that the duty
to provide the notice had shifted to the architect, and that it was
not the custom or practice in the business community for an archi-
tect to shoulder this responsibility."'
2. IMPROPER PAYMENTS
If the owner makes any payment of money before recording the
notice of commencement, that payment will be considered improper
65. FLA. STAT. § 713.07(2) (1977); 2 R. BoYER, supra note 14, at 1089. This is known as
the "relation back" concept. The owner could choose to circumvent the relation back concept
by not filing the notice of commencement. The claim of lien would then take priorty as of
the time of its recordation. FLA. STAT. § 713.07(2) (1977). By either delaying or omitting the
filing of the notice of commencement, the owner could deliberately fix the priorities.
66. FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1) (1977). This provision outlines the information which should
appear in a notice of commencement: legal description and address of the property; descrip-
tion of the improvement; name and address of the owner and contractor (and, in the event
of a bond, the name and address of the surety and the amount of the bond); and the name
and address of any person the owner designates to receive notices under the statute. The 1977
amendments, effective July 1, 1978, require the furnishing of the name and address of any
person making a loan for the construction of the improvements. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, §
14 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1) (1977)).
67. FLA. STAT. § 713.13(2) (1977).
68. Id. § 713.13(4).
69. Id. § 713.13(1). Presumably, the owner could, by contract, shift the duty to perform
this obligation.
70. 347 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
71. Id. at 1083.
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and the owner may be liable beyond the contract price.7" The recent
case of Tamarac Village, Inc. v. Bates & Daly Co.7" illustrates this
potentially drastic consequence. In Tamarac, the owner paid the
contractor $15,315.08 of a contract price of $79,725.00 before record-
ing a notice of commencement."' The contractor abandoned the job
and the owner completed the job at a cost of $20,501.56 above the
contract price. After abandonment and before renewing work, the
owner also failed to file a notice of recommencement pursuant to
section 713.07(4) of the Florida Statutes."5 The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that the owner's failure to file the two
notices prevented him from defeating the lienor's claim. 7 Although
the separate sums of $15,315.08 and $20,501.56 had been paid to the
contractors, these sums were deemed not paid, and the owner re-
mained liable to the lienor.
Tamarac is noteworthy for another reason. Not only did the
owner fail to perform its obligations under the statute, but the lienor
also violated the statute since notice vas not given to the owner
after abandonment. The court ignored the absence of notice to
owner, suggesting that the owner's noncompliance excuses noncom-
pliance by the lienor.
7
1
The 1977 amendment would appear to require a different re-
sult. As amended, section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes now
reads: "The notice [to owner] must be served regardless of the
method of payments, whether proper or improper . . . .-17 In this
amendment, the legislature provided that the filing of the notice to
owner and the recording of the notice of commencement are inde-
72. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(a) (1977).
73. 348 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
74. Id. at 24. The contract price refers to the amount agreed upon by the contracting
parties as adjusted by any change in the scope of the work, defects in workmanship or other
breaches of contract. If no price is agreed upon, then the contract price translates into the
value of labor, services or materials covered by the contract as adjusted. FLA. STAT. §
713.01(3) n.1 (1977).
75. 348 So. 2d at 24-25.
When a contractor has abandoned the job and the owner wishes to complete the construc-
tion, he has two choices. He may pay the lienors either in full or pro rata in accordance with
§ 713.06(4) or he can proceed by filing a notice of recommencement. FLA. STAT. § 713.07(4)
(1977). If the owner takes the latter course, he may offset the reasonable cost of completion
from the value of the original contract once he has fulfilled the necessary notice requirements
to prior lienors. See 1 S. RAKusiN, FLORiDA MEcHANics' LIEN MANUAL ch. 14, at 17 (1974).
76. 348 So. 2d at 25.
77. Id; see Wool Wholesale Plumbing Supply, 365 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
78. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977)). Both this
provision and the previous version apply only to lienors who are not in privity with the owner.




pendent obligations (apart from the fact that the notice of com-
mencement provides the lienor with information needed for the
notice to owner). Yet, given the choice between having to penalize
an owner or a lienor for failure to follow the statute, the Florida
Legislature chose to penalize the lienor.79 Still, the lienor does bene-
fit from such exacting standards in cases where he seeks to gain
priority over noncomplying co-lienors.
3. THE PROPER PAYMENTS PROVISION
Although the proper payments concept is inseparable from the
operation of the notice of commencement, the proper payments
concept appears in section 713.06 of the Florida Statutes," which
concerns liens of persons not in privity. This might lead an owner
to conclude erroneously that he need not be concerned with proper
payments, and hence a notice of commencement, with regard to
persons with whom he is in privity. Therefore, the notice of com-
mencement provision of section 713.13 of the Florida Statutes
ought to be amended to incorporate the proper payments provision
of section 713.06.
D. The Contractor's Affidavit
1. WHEN AN AFFIDAVIT IS REQUIRED
The contractor must furnish the owner with an affidavit when
the final payment under a direct contract is due."' The affidavit
identifies unpaid subcontractors and thereby protects the owner
from paying more than once for the same labor, service or material."2
This affidavit must be delivered to the owner five days before the
institution of a lien foreclosure action." Section 713.06 of the Florida
Statutes also requires a contractor's affidavit even if final payment
79. While the provision does describe the means of payment to a materialman, it is
primarily aimed at protecting the owner against unknown lienors and excessive loss. 1 S.
RAKUSIN, supra note 75, ch. 8, at 9.
The 1977 change specifically eliminated the § 713.06(3)(c)4 "savings clause" and estab-
lished failure to give timely notice as a complete defense against all lienors not in privity.
1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977)); see 1 S. RAKUSiN,
supra note 75, ch. 8, at 10-11; notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra.
80. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3) & n.1 (1977).
81. Id. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) n.1.
82. Hardee v. Richardson, 47 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1950) (construing FLA. STAT. § 84.06
(1941), predecessor to present § 713.06). The contractor's affidavit, where appropriate, shall
state that some or all lienors have been paid. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FIA.
STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1977)).
83. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) n.1 (1977).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
does not become due because of a premature termination of con-
struction."
A problem addressed by the 1977 amendment to section
713.06(3)(d)(1) of the Florida Statutes," was found in Leader Mort-
gage Co. v. Rickards Electric Service, Inc."5 There, a contractor was
employed under an oral contract to perform electrical work. The
contractor quit the job when the owner breached. At that time (and
later in the claim of lien and subsequent pleadings), the contractor
alleged that the total outstanding balance of the contract was due.
The owner contended that the failure to file the contractor's affida-
vit barred recovery. The contractor claimed that since construction
was not completed and final payment not due, a contractor's affida-
vit was not necessary." The court found this argument to be an
"unacceptable paradox" in light of the demand for full and final
payment and found for the owner.
88
2. WHO MUST FILE
Only contractors need file an affidavit.89 Those who are able to
allege status as a subcontractor need not file before bringing an
action." On the other hand, a small business concern accustomed
to being considered a subcontractor may find itself in the statutory
role of contractor. In Atlantic Gardens Landscaping, Inc. v. Boca
Raton Land Development, Inc.,"1 the owner also acted as contractor.
Since plaintiff, a landscaping company, had contracted directly
with the owner, it came under the statutory definition of
"contractor" and was obliged to file a contractor's affidavit." Thus,
the lienor was not entitled to the protection usually accorded a
subcontractor under the Mechanics' Lien Law.
84. Id. This means that the contractor should furnish the affidavit not only in the case
of an owner's breach but also when the contractor has abandoned the job.
85. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1977)).
86. 348 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
87. Id. at 1204.
88. Id. at 1205.
89. FiA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) n.1 (1977).
90.. Viyella v. Jackson, 347 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also note 86 supra.
91. 360 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
92. Id. at 1279-80 (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.01(2) (1975)). This provision defines contractor
as inter alia, a person other than a laborer or materialman who enters into a contract with
the owner of real property for improving it.
Section 713.01(2) was similarly invoked in Leader Mortgage Co. v. Rickards Elec. Serv.,
Inc., 348 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In that case, a printed form had identified the
company supplying electrical work as being a "subcontractor." Nevertheless, the court
viewed the circumstances as grounds for holding the company to be a contractor under the
statutory definition. Id. at 1205.
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The need for a contractor's affidavit was again at issue in
Oppenheim v. Newport Systems Development Corp.93 In this case
the party bringing the foreclosure action was an architect. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District assumed, but did not hold, that
the affidavit requirement applied to architects.9 ' The law has since
been changed to reach a different rule. A new amendment directed
to professionals such as architects now reads: "No lienor under this
section shall be required to serve . . . an affidavit concerning un-
paid lienors as provided in [section] 713.06(3)."''
The 1977 amendments add a new class'to those lienors who
must file a contractor's affidavit. Except for laborers or material-
men, subcontractors who come into privity with the owner at any
time must furnish an affidavit."
A contractor who fails toprovide an affidavit is not necessarily
prohibited from alleging a lien. Case law has carved out an excep-
tion to furnishing the contractor's affidavit. If the contractor can
establish facts that excuse compliance with section 713.06(3)(d)(1)
of the Florida Statutes, then he may proceed with his action without
having filed the affidavit. 7 This was acknowledged recently by the
Third District in Oppenheim."
In Oppenheim, a contractor"' who failed to file the affidavit
alleged that no unpaid subcontractors existed and that no one em-
ployed by him had an outstanding claim. The failure to furnish the
affidavit was raised in the owner's answer, but the owner did not
therein provide proof to contradict the contractor's allegations. The
court stated that summary judgment would be premature since the
factual issues would have to be resolved at trial. 00 The court's rea-
soning was based on the policy that the affidavit serves to protect
the owner. The nonexistence of unpaid lienors is apparently the
kind of circumstances where compliance would be excused because
93. 348 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
94. Id. at 330.
95. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.03(3) (1977)).
96. Id. § 4 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (1977)).
97. See Oppenheim v. Newport Sys. Dev. Corp., 348 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977);
Brown v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 160 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (citing former
FLA. STAT. § 84.04(3) (1959)). The recent case of Falovitch v. Gunn & Gunn Constr. Co., 348
So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), however, maintained that "strict compliance with the Me-
chanics' Lien Law is an indispensable prerequisite to seeking affirmative relief thereunder."
Id. at 562.
98. 348 So. 2d at 330.
99. The contractor was an architect. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
100. 348 So. 2d at 330. The Third District, however, indicated that if the defendant had
responded with a motion to dismiss, the trial court could have dismissed the case. Id. at 329-
30.
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the owner would be in no danger of making double payment on the
bill."'
3. 1977 AMENDMENTS
When the contractor's affidavit recites debts to lienors, the
owner may bypass the contractor and pay the lienors directly if he
gives the contractor ten days notice." 2 The 1977 amendment adds:
(1) lienors who have not given notice and whose forty-five day notice
period pursuant to section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes has
not expired may be paid (in full or pro rata) from any balance which
may still be due the contractor; and (2) lienors who have not given
notice and whose forty-five days have expired may not be paid.' 3
This latter provision reflects stricter standard of construction which
is in contrast with the prior relaxation of the notice requirement by
case law.'0'
The 1977 amendment also altered a formerly well established
rule. Prior to 1977, the owner had to withhold either the final pay-
ment or ten percent of the original contract price, whichever was
larger, until receipt of the contractor's affidavit. Now the owner may
only retain the final payment."'
E. Delivery of Materials
One who has furnished materials may have a lien when the
materials are incorporated into the improvement.' 6 A lien will also
attach for materials supplied for construction but not remaining in
the improvement and for the reasonable rental value of tools (except
handtools) and machinery.' 7 Delivery of materials is prima facie
evidence that they were incorporated into the improvement.' 8
The materialman must introduce evidence at trial to show that
the materials were delivered to the site. In American Insurance Co.
v. Coley Electric Supply Co.,'"0 the lower court's presumption of
delivery was overturned by the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
101. Cf. Atlantic Gardens Landscaping, Inc. v. Boca Raton Land Dev., Inc., 360 So. 2d
1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (noncompliance can be successfully pleaded).
102. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(2) (1977).
103. Id.
104. See text accompanying notes 178-86 infra.
105. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(5) (1977)).
106. FLA. STAT. § 713.01(6) (1977).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 354 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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trict, since no testimony had beeh introduced to show delivery."0
The burden of proof is clearly on the materialman."'
The statute provides for a notice of delivery where a project
consists of six or more improvements or of one improvement valued
at more than $50,000.112 In either case the materialman must deliver
to a place other than the site of improvement. The seller and pur-
chaser of the materials must execute and serve upon the owner a
statutory "Notice of Delivery."'' While the lienor must serve this
notice on the owner, this does not obviate the requirement of serving
the notice to owner pursuant to section 713.06(2) of the Florida
Statutes."'
F. Repossession of Materials not Used
A person who wishes to repossess materials which have not been
incorporated into an improvement has two courses of action: re-
plevin and peaceable self-help." 5 A materialman chose replevin as
a means to recover its materials in National Steel Products v. Don-
ald L. Myrick & Associates, Inc."' This gave the District Court of
Appeals, Second District, the opportunity to clarify the elements of
a replevin action under section 713.15 of the Florida Statutes (1975).
In National Steel the owner made two payments, leaving an
unpaid balance of $27,502.44 for materials for the construction of a
skating rink. The owner's bank dishonored his final payment. The
improvement was abandoned and unincorporated materials were
not removed from the site. Upon the materialman's suit to replevy,
the owner first maintained that section 713.15 did not give the
owner a right to replevy independent of Florida's replevin statute."7
The court held that section 713.15 did afford a right to replevy
without resort to chapter 78 of the Florida Statutes. 8
The owner also argued that replevin could only be maintained
after the materialman had refunded the owner's first two payments
(the materialman had not so refunded those payments). The court
110. The court suggested that evidence establishing that the materials are "specially
fabricated for incorporation" will suffice. 354 So. 2d at 391.
111. Id.
112. FLA. STAT. § 713.09(2) (1977). The notice contains the cost of materials, the identi-
ties of the parties, the address of delivery and a description of the property being improved.
Id.
113. Id. The service of notice will suffice to establish the fact of deiivery at trial.
114. Id.
115. FLA. STAT. § 713.15 (1977).
116. 353 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
117. Id. at 659 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01-.21 (1975)).
118. Id. at 659.
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focused on the wording of the last sentence of section 713.15 and
concluded that a refund as a condition precedent to recovery applies
only to a self-help repossession." Refund is unnecessary when re-
plevin is sought because a court can limit recovery to those materi-
als for which there was no payment. In the self-help situation, how-
ever, there is nothing to ensure that the materialman does not repos-
sess beyond the value due him.
G. Statement of Account
The owner may demand a statement of account in writing from
any lienor.'2 0 The statement shows the nature of the materials or
services furnished in the past or to be furnished, as well as the
amount paid, amount due or amount to become due.' Failure to
provide this statement subjects the lienor to a loss of his claim of
lien. Previously, the lienor had ten days in which to provide the
statement. The 1977 amendments now give the lienor thirty days.'22
This change acts to ease the burden on a corporate lienor with an
overworked bookkeeping department.
H. Duration of the Right to Claim a Lien
The Mechanics' Lien Law version of a statute of limitations is
found at section 713.22(1) of the Florida Statutes, and provides that
an action to enforce a lien must be commenced no later than one
year after the claim of lien is recorded.'
One court described section 713.22(1) as "not like an ordinary
statute of limitations affecting merely the remedy, but it enters into
and becomes a part of the right of action itself."'24 In that case, a
subcontractor originally sought a money judgment against its con-
tractor. Fifteen months after the claim of lien, the contractor filed
a transfer bond. Nine months later, or two years after the claim of
lien had been filed, the subcontractor sought to amend its complaint
to enforce its claim of lien against the transfer bond. This was the
first time that the subcontractor sought a remedy under the Me-
119. Id. at 659-60.
120. FLA. STAT. § 713.16(2) (1977).
121. Id.
122. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 8 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.16(2) (1977)).
123. Id. § 9 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.22(1) (1977)). This amendment now requires the
filing of a notice of lis pendens in order to continue the effectiveness of the lien after the
commencement of the action as against intervening creditors and subsequent bona fide pur-
chasers. Id.




chanics' Lien Law, having sued previously in contract. The court
held that regardless of whether the amendment related back to the
original complaint, the lien was extinguished after one year and no
lien action could survive.
25
Under a different set of circumstances, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, construed section 713.22(1) liberally in B
& H Sales, Inc. v. Fusco Corp. 2 The lienor filed its claim and later
foreclosed against a corporation operating under the fictitious name
of Sunshine Associates, Inc. When the identity of the true owner,
the Fusco Corporation, was discovered a year and three months
after the filing of the claim of lien, the lienor was permitted to
amend to correct the misnomer. The court distinguished suing the
wrong party from suing the correct party and seeking to rectify a
misnomer, suggesting that in the former instance, an amendment
would be barred by section 713.22(1).11
I. Risk of Owner's Nonpayment
When the owner does not pay the contractor the contractor's
duty to pay its subcontractor is called into question. Usually the
contractor and subcontractor address the question of who shall bear
the risk of the owner's default in their contract. In the absence of
such language or where the language is ambiguous, the Florida ap-
pellate courts have rendered conflicting decisions.' 28 Recently, in
Peacock Construction Co. v. Modern Air Conditioning, Inc.,,2 the
Supreme Court of Florida settled the matter by deciding that, ab-
sent a clear shift of risk to the subcontractor, the contractor remains
liable. In this case, the contractor made written subcontracts which
provided for final payment "within 30 days after the completion of
the work included in this sub-contract, written acceptance by the
Architect and full payment therefor by the Owner."' 30 When the
owner failed to pay the contractor, the contractor then refused to
pay its subcontractors on the ground that payment from the owner
was a condition precedent to their payment.
In finding for the subcontractor as a matter of law, the court
125. Id. at 645.
126. 342 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
127. All of the defensive pleadings were in the name of Sunshine Associates, Inc. Id. at
106.
128. Compare Edward J. Gerrits, Inc. v. Astor Elec. Serv., Inc., 328 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1976) with Peacock Constr. Co. v. Modem Air Conditioning, Inc., 339 So. 2d 294 (Fla.
2d DCA 1976).
129. 353 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1977).
130. Id. at 841.
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focused on the nature of the transaction. In the common subcon-
tract transaction, the intent of the parties is that the subcontractor
not bear the risk. This result is grounded upon the consideration
that a subcontractor "must have payment for [its] work in order
to remain in business."'' While the same could be said for the
contractor, the decision explicitly seeks to protect the nonprivity
subcontractor, the person who has no leverage or control over the
owner.'32
Two months after handing down its decision in Peacock
Construction, the Supreme Court of Florida took the next logical
step in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Warren Brothers Co. '" This
case again involved Peacock Construction Company, but this time
the litigant was Peacock's surety who issued a payment bond pur-
suant to section 713.23 of the Florida Statutes (1975). The contract
contained the same ambiguous language as in the Peacock
Construction case."' The court held that the surety stood in the
contractor's place and was obligated to pay the subcontractor.'
35
III. PRIORrrIES
The mechanic's lien claimant frequently finds himself compet-
ing with another party claiming an interest in the property upon
which he seeks to enforce his claim of lien. The competitor can be
one of several parties asserting an interest in the property, includ-
ing, for example, another mechanic's lien claimant or a mortgage
lender. The priority to be accorded these competing interests de-
pends in part upon the time of recordation of the asserted claim, the
nature of the interest in the property and equitable considerations.
A. Priorities Under Section 713.07
Section 713.07(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that liens on
subdivision improvements "' and liens for professional services 137
shall attach at the time of recordation of the claim of lien and shall
take priority as of that time. In Baumgartner Construction Co. v.
131. Id. at 842.
132. The court went on to say that its decision should not be viewed as "anti-general
contractor." The parties may shift the risk in a clearly expressed contractual clause. Id. at
842-43.
133. 355 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1978).
134. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
135. 355 So. 2d at 788.
136. FLA. STAT. § 713.04 (1977).
137. Id. § 713.03 n.1.
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Harrel, I' the District Court of Appeal, First District, addressed the
issue of whether section 713.07(1) "affords the first subcontractor to
file a lien against a subdivision a higher priority than that of other
claimants under the same contract who timely file their claims."' 39
The court held, inter alia, that a subdivision lienor who first records
his claim of lien takes priority over other lienors who later file.140
Section 713.07(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that the liens
of persons in privity"' and not in privity"I shall attach and take
priority as of the time of recordation of the notice of commence-
ment, but in the event that a notice of commencement is not filed,
then such liens shall attach and take priority as of the time the
claim of lien is recorded."' Accordingly, when an owner files a notice
of commencement, a lienor's claim of lien "relates back" to and
attaches at the time that the notice of commencement was filed.'44
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. Ousley Sod Co., "5 the District Court
of Appeals, Fourth District, construed the "relation back" concept
of section 713.07(2). In that case a mortgage lender instituted fore-
closure proceedings after a notice of commencement had been filed
but before a mechanic's lien claimant had filed its claim of lien. The
lien claimant argued that its claim of lien related back to the filing
of the notice of commencement, thus entitling it to foreclosure on
the property which the mortgage lender had acquired on default of
the mortgage.
The court found, however, that the lis pendens,"' which the
mortgage lender had filed simultaneously with the institution of the
foreclosure proceedings, barred the claim of lien from relating back
to the filing of the notice of commencement. The court found section
713.07(2) and the relation back concept to be inapplicable and held
that the lis pendens statute was dispositive.17
Section 713.07(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that any con-
138. 364 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
139. Id. at 804.
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 713.05 n.1 (1977).
142. Id. § 713.06 & n.1.
143. Id. § 713.07(2).
144. See, e.g., Miller Elec. Co. v. Sweeney, 199 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1967); Palm Beach Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lainhart, 84 Fla. 662, 95 So. 122 (1923).
145. 351 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
146. FLA. STAT. § 48.23(1)(b) (1977), which provides:
(b) The filing for record of such notice of lis pendens shall constitute a bar
to the enforcement against the property described in said notice of Rs pendens of
all liens including but not limited to federal tax liens and levies, unrecorded at
the time of filing for record such notice of lis pendens ....
147. 351 So. 2d at 59-60.
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veyance, encumbrance or demand recorded against real property
prior to the attachment of a mechanic's lien shall take priority over
such lien."8 This section was applied to defeat a mechanic's lien in
Corry Construction Co. v. Hector Construction Cos. "I In December,
1972, Corry, a mechanic's lien claimant, furnished a notice to the
owner, Will-O-Wick, Inc. In April, 1973, Will-O-Wick, Inc. trans-
ferred the subject property to Will-O-Wick Apartments, a limited
partnership. Corry filed a claim of lien in May, 1973, erroneously
naming Will-O-Wick, Inc. as the owner.
The court refused to allow Corry to enforce its claim of lien
against the property owned by Will-O-Wick Apartments. The court
found that Corry's lien had not attached to the property prior to the
time Will-O-Wick, Inc. conveyed it to Will-O-Wick Apartments
because the lien was filed more than one month after the convey-
ance. ' Accordingly, under 713.07(3) the transferee of the property,
Will-O-Wick Apartments, had priority over Corry's lien. Further-
more, Corry's claim could not be saved by the relation back doc-
trine, since no notice of commencement had been filed. 5'
B. The Mechanics' Lien Claimant Versus the Mortgage Lender
1. SECTION 713.13(5)
Section 713.13(5) of the Florida Statutes provides that a claim
of lien shall not relate back to the date of the recording of the notice
of commencement to defeat the rights of any individual who ac-
quired "title or any interest in real property from the owner" after
one year from the date of recording the notice of commencement. 5"
The issue of whether a mortgage constitutes "any interest in real
property" within the meaning of section 713.13(5) has recently been
decided by the District Courts of Appeal, Second and Fourth Dis-
tricts.
148. FLA. STAT. § 713.07(3) (1977).
149. 363 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
150. Id. at 1127.
151. The record on appeal shows only that Corry filed a claim of lien on May 21, 1973.
The record also contains copies of the warranty deed conveying the property in question from
the corporate Will-O-Wick to the limited partnership. The deed bears a notation that it was
filed and recorded in Escambia County on April 16, 1973, more than a month before Corry's
claim of lien was filed. As a result, the limited partnership's interest was not subject to sale
to satisfy Corry's claim. Id.
152. FLA. STAT. § 713.13(5), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the notice of commencement, any notice of comm-
encement heretofore or hereafter recorded shall not be effective as to any person
acquiring title or any interest in real property from the owner or under him after
1 year from the date of recording the notice of commencement.
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In Southern Colonial Mortgage Co. v. Medeiros, 5 3 a mortgagee
extended loans to the purchasers of two condominium units and
recorded the mortgages in March and April, 1974. Portions of the
loans were used to secure releases from the construction lender who
had provided and recorded the original mortgage loan for the con-
struction of the project in September, 1972. The notice of com-
mencement on the construction project was recorded in May, 1973.
Claims of lien were filed in August, October and November, 1974,
and in January, 1975.'11
When the condominium unit purchasers defaulted, the mortga-
gees initiated a foreclosure action and joined the lienors as defen-
dants. The trial court found that the lienors' claims were superior
to those of the mortgagees because the liens related back to the date
of the notice of commencement which had been filed prior to the
recording of the mortgages.'55
On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, the
mortgagees argued that they had acquired an interest in real prop-
erty more than one year after the filing of the notice of commence-
ment within the meaning of section 713.13(5), and were therefore
entitled to priority over the lien claimants. The court rejected this
argument and found that under Florida law, a mortgage does not
convey title or create "any interest in real property.""'5 The court
noted that even if mortgages were defined as constituting any inter-
est in real property, section 713.13(5) was nevertheless inapplicable
to these mortgagees, since the mortgages were recorded within one
year of the filing of the notice of commencement.'5
The court was more receptive to the mortgagees' argument that
they were entitled to priority over the lien claimants because they
had become subrogated to the construction lender's rights to the
extent that their mortgages had been used to secure releases from
him. Since the construction lender's mortgage predated the record-
ing of the liens, and since the mortgagees' loans paid off in full the
construction lender's mortgage on each unit, the court agreed that
the mortgagees should be given priority over the lien claimants to
the extent that their mortgages were used to pay the construction
lender. 58
153. 347 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
154. Id. at 737.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 738 (citing United of Fla., Inc. v. Illini Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 341 So. 2d
793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)); accord, Acco, Inc. v. Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 352 So. 2d
884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
157. 347 So. 2d at 738.
158. Id. at 738-39.
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The dissent disagreed with the majority's construction of the
scope of section 713.13(5), arguing that although a mortgagee does
not acquire title to or an interest in land, this rubric of real property
law should not be applied to section 713.13(5) of the Mechanics'
Lien Law.'50 Indeed, the dissenting judge aptly demonstrated the
anomalous result of the majority holding:
To suggest that the legislature intended that a property owner
could not defeat the priority of mechanics lien holders by mort-
gaging his property, but could do so by the simple act of selling
or leading it to those who, in turn, could about face and secure
exactly the same financing, is, to say the least, unlikely.' 60
Other arrangements to obtain financing which entail the convey-
ance of any interest in real property exist, and could be used to
circumvent the Fourth District's interpretation of 713.13(5).
Section 713.13(5) of the Florida Statutes received a similar con-
struction in a case decided by the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, six months earlier.'"' In that case, the owners of a condomi-
nium complex sold four units to purchasers within one year of the
filing of a notice of commencement. The purchasers executed mort-
gages in favor of a mortgage lender who assigned them to Illini
Federal more than one year after the notice of commencement was
filed. United, a plumbing subcontractor, then filed its claim of lien
against the condominium property."2
The Second District held that the assignment of the mortgages
to the assignee more than one year after the notice of commence-
ment was filed did not create an interest in real property within the
meaning of section 713.13(5)." '6 Consequently, the claim of lien re-
lated back to the notice of commencement and was given priority
over the mortgages held by the assignee. The court noted that even
if the mortgages were deemed interests in real property, the assignee
had rights no greater than those of the assignor and the assignor had
no rights superior to those of the lien claimant under section
713.13(5) because the assignor acquired the mortgages within one
year of the filing of the notice of commencement.' 4 Accordingly, the
court found that the lien claimant's rights in the property were
superior to those of the assignee of the mortgages.
159. Id. at 740 (Letts, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 741.
161. United of Fla., Inc. v. Illini Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 341 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977).
162. Id.




A special concurring opinion questioned the necessity of the
decision of the court on the issue of whether a mortgage is any
interest in real property within the contemplation of the Mechanics'
Lien Law."5 Judge Scheb concurred with the majority on the ground
that an assignee of a mortgage stands in a position no better than
its assignor, but he argued that the cases cited by the majority for
the proposition that a mortgage is not an interest in real property
should not be dispositive in a mechanic's lien case. 6 '
It is apparent from both the dissenting opinion in Southern
Colonial and the special concurring opinion in United of Florida
that there is a lack of consensus as to what interests in real property
constitute "any interest in real property" for purposes of section
713.13(5). The legislature should revise this section and specifically
identify those interests in real property which are meant to fall
within the ambit of section 713.13(5).
2. ESTOPPEL
Many of the considerations discussed in the Equitable Lien
section of this article are applicable to situations where a lien claim-
ant finds himself competing for priority with a mortgage lender who
has instituted foreclosure proceedings against an owner in default.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Florida articulated the circumstances
under which a mortgage lender would be equitably estopped from
asserting the priority of its mortgage over the lien of a mechanic's
lien claimant.6 7
In Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First National Bank &
Trust Co."'6 subcontractors furnished labor and materials to a con-
struction project. During the course of construction the mortgagee
of the construction loan (hereinafter Bank) made various assurances
to the subcontractors: (1) that there were sufficient funds in the loan
account to complete the project; (2) that they should continue to
furnish labor and materials; (3) that there was no need to file me-
chanics' liens; and (4) that the Bank would do everything it could
to see that the subcontractors continued to furnish labor and mate-
rials. When the subcontractors were not paid they filed liens and
instituted foreclosure. In response, the Bank asserted the priority of
165. Id. at 795. (Scheb, J., concurring specially).
166. Id.
167. See Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 361 So. 2d 156
(Fla. 1978).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 157.
1979] 1127
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
its recorded mortgage. 170
The trial court, finding that the subcontractors had relied on
the Bank's statements, held that the Bank was equitably estopped
from asserting the priority of its mortgage over petitioners' liens.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed on the ground
that since the Bank had made no statements which were fraudulent,
untrue or misrepresentative, the Bank was not estopped from as-
serting the priority of its mortgage.'
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, the subcontrac-
tors argued that under Gulf Shore Dredging Co. v. Ingram, "I equita-
ble estoppel is based on general considerations of right and justice
and does not require proof of fraud and misrepresentation.' The
supreme court rejected the subcontractors' arguments and held that
a party may successfully maintain a suit under the theory of equita-
ble estoppel only where there is proof of fraud, misrepresentation or
other affirmative deception.'
Although the result in the Rinker case appears to be harsh, it
should be noted that the trial court found that the statements made
by the Bank were neither fraudulent nor untrue. The Rinker case
and Indiana Mortgage & Realty Investors v. Peacock Construction
Co., "I are instructive nonetheless. The subcontractor should be vigi-
lant in securing his statutory rights and not be mesmerized by the
assurances of a construction lender which may later turn out to be
ill-founded.'76
C. The Crane Case and Priorities
Section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires a lienor to
serve the owner of real property with a notice to owner within forty-
five days from commencing to furnish services or materials.' Prior
to July 1, 1978, a lienor who had failed timely to file a notice to
owner was, under certain limited circumstances, still permitted to
170.. Id.
171. Id. at 159.
172. 193 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).
173. Id. at 234 (citing Oates v. Prudential Ins. Co., 107 Fla. 224, 147 So. 418 (1932)).
174. 361 So. 2d at 159. The supreme court overruled Gulf Shore Dredging, 193 So. 2d at
232, and North v. Culmer, 193 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), to the extent that they
conflicted with its holdiig.
175. 348 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
176. In Indiana Mortgage the court said: "The mistaken observation that there seemed
to be enough money left in undisbursed loan funds to complete the project falls short of what
we contemplated as 'affirmative deception' . . . ." Id. at 60-61.
177. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977). For a discussion of § 713.06(2)(a), see notes
14-23 and accompanying text.
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recover on a pro rata basis by virtue of the "savings clause" in
section 713.06(3)(c)4 of the Florida Statutes.'78
In Crane Co. v. Fine, 7 the savings clause in section
713.06(3)(c)4 was construed in favor of an unpaid lienor listed in a
contractor's final payment affidavit who had failed timely to file a
notice to owner although he had served the notice within the time
period prescribed for filing a claim of lien.' 0 It was ruled that the
unpaid lienor was entitled to a pro rata portion of any sums remain-
ing due the contractor (or other person with whom the lienor was in
privity) after all the lienors giving timely notice had been paid.',
The Crane rule worked in favor of the lienor who served the
notice to owner in an untimely manner or who had simply failed to
serve the notice to owner altogether. The operation of the Crane
rule, however, did not adversely affect the owner, since he was ac-
countable only to the noncomplying lienor to the extent of the
amount he owed the individual with whom the lienor was in priv-
ity. 82 Numerous cases decided after Crane had applied the rule of
178. Prior to its amendment, FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(c)(4) (1977) provided:
No person furnishing labor or material or both who is required to serve a notice
under subsection (2)(a), and who did not serve such notice and whose time for
such service has expired shall be paid because he is listed in an affidavit furnished
by the contractor under this subsection until all lienors giving notice and lienors
listed in such affidavit whose time for serving such notice has not expired have
been paid in full. If there is a balance due the contractor after all of said lienors
have been paid in full, any of said persons who failed to serve timely notice shall
be paid in full or pro rata according to the amounts of their claims to the extent
of such balance due the contractor; provided, this shall not be construed to permit
any claim or demand whatsoever by said persons failing to serve timely notice
against the owner.
179. 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969).
180. Id. at 152.
181. Id.
182. This assumes that the owner had fully complied with the statute. Prior to the
amendment of § 713.06, if the owner had made improper payments either by failing to file a
notice of commencement or by neglecting to secure a contractor's affidavit, the noncomplying
lienor was permitted to enforce his lien against the owner.
For example, in Tamarac Village, Inc. v. Bates & Daly Co., 348 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA
1977), the owner made payments to the general contractor prior to recording its notice of
commencement and, after the general contractor abandoned the project, made additional
payments to complete construction without filing a notice of commencement for the recom-
menced construction as required by FLA. STAT. § 713.07(4) (1977). The court found that since
those payments were improperly made and should have been retained by the owner, the
lienor, who had failed to serve notice to owner within the time period prescribed by FLA. STAT.
§ 713.06(2)(a) (1977), was entitled to enforce his lien against the owner's property, to the
extent of the amounts improperly paid.
In Konsler Steel Co. v. Partin, 356 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1978), the owner failed to obtain a
contractor's affidavit upon making the final payment. Under FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(5)
(1977), the owner was required to withhold final payment until he had received the contrac-
tor's affidavit. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the lienor, who had failed to serve a
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that case to permit the noncomplying lienor to recover at least par-
tially for materials or services furnished.'83
The Crane rule has since been abrogated by statute."8 ' In 1977,
the legislature amended section 713.06 of the Florida Statutes to
preclude any possible construction that failure timely to file a notice
to owner will not bar a claim of lien but merely affect its priority.'"
Section 713.06(2)(a) now provides that the failure to serve the notice
shall be a complete defense to payment by any person, except a
person with whom the lienor failing to serve the notice has a con-
tract. Section 713.06(2)(c)4 provides that if the notice to owner is
not served in a timely manner, the lienor is not entitled to payment,
even if he is listed in the contractor's affidavit.
The abrogation of the Crane rule has left the owner in a favored
position. For example, suppose the owner of real property retains a
general contractor for the construction of a building but fails to file
a notice of commencement until two months later. When final pay-
ment is made to the general contractor, the owner does not obtain
a contractor's affidavit. The general contractor subsequently be-
comes insolvent and makes no payments to his suppliers. Under
section 713.06(3), the sums paid to the general contractor prior to
the filing of the notice of commencement and the final payment
made without obtaining a contractor's affidavit were "improper
payments." But under the current Mechanics' Lien Law the owner,
notice to bwner within the time period prescribed in FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977), was
nevertheless entitled to enforce his lien to the extent of the amount that the owner should
have retained until he received the contractor's affidavit.
If the factual situations in Tamarac and Konsler arose today, the lienors would not have
a statutory mechanic's lien claim against the owners. As of July 1, 1978, FLA. STAT. §
713.06(3)(c) n.1 (1977) provides:
No person furnishing labor or material, or both, who is required to serve a notice
under paragraph (2)(a), and who did not serve the notice and whose time for
service has expired shall be entitled to be paid by the owner because he is listed
in an affidavit furnished by the contractor under subparagraph (c)1.
Section 713.06(2)(a) now provides in pertinent part that "the failure to serve the notice shall
be a complete defense to payment by any person, except a person with whom the lienor failing
to serve the notice has a contract."
183. See, e.g., Lopez Terrazzo & Tile, Inc. v. Cooper, 302 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974);
Moretrench Corp. v. Bronson & Veal Enterprises, Inc., 262 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
184. Crane stands for two propositions: (1) a lien claimant who has failed to perfect his
statutory mechanic's lien rights is not thereby precluded from establishing an equitable lien;.
and (2) a lienor who has failed timely to file a notice to owner but has served the notice within
the time period prescribed for filing a claim of lien, is entitled to a pro rata portion of any
sums remaining due the contractor (or other person with whom the lienor was in privity) after
all the lienors giving timely notice have been paid. It is the second proposition which the
legislature has specifically negated. A lienor who has failed timely to file a notice to owner
might still be able to establish an equitable lien, but he would be required to prove the
existence of "special and peculiar equities." See text accompanying notes 258-62 infra.
185. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5.
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who has violated the provisions of the statute, is not liable to the
lienor not in privity who has failed timely to file a notice to owner.
The 1977 legislative revision changed the status of the lienor
who fails timely to file the notice to owner required by section
713.06(2)(a). Prior to the revision the lienor was entitled to a pro
rata portion of any sums remaining due the contractor (or other
individual with whom the lienor was in privity) after all the lienors
who had given timely notice had been paid. The current law pre-
vents any lienor not in privity with the owner who has not timely
filed a notice of owner from obtaining any lien on undisbursed funds
held by the owner.' 8
IV. PAYMENT BONDS AND TRANSFERS TO SECURITY
A. Elements of a Payment Bond
The owner may require the contractor to shield the owner from
potential claims of lienors by furnishing a payment bond.'87 The
payment bond must be "in at least the amount of the original con-
tract price before commencing the construction of the improvement
under the direct contract."'' 5 Thus, the surety is protected from
liability for any "extras"''5 which the owner may authorize without
the permission of the surety.' The bond is conditioned upon the
contractor's prompt payment to all lienors under the contractor's
direct contract.' The owner remains liable only for the liens of the
contractor who furnished the bond.'1
2
186. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(2) n.1 (1977) does make provision for the lienor whose 45-
day time period has not expired at the time the general contractor executes his final payment
affidavit. The relevant passage provides:
Lienors listed in said affidavit not giving notice, whose 45-day notice time has not
expired shall be paid in full or pro rata, as appropriate, from any balance then
remaining due the contractor, but no lienor whose notice time has expired shall
be paid by the owner or by any other person except the person with whom that
lienor has a contract.
Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 713.23 n.1 (1977). Under the prior statute, resort to a payment bond
was not mandatory. Houdaille Indus., Inc. vi United Bonding Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1048, 1051
(5th Cir. 1972).
188. FLA. STAT. § 713.23 n.1 (1977).
189. In this context "extras" are any labor, services or materials authorized by the owner
in addition to labor covered by the previous contract. Id. § 713.01(5).
190. See 2 RAKUSIN, note 75 supra, ch. 28, at 19.
191. FLA. STAT. § 713.23 n.1 (1977). Presumably, if the owner bypasses his contractor and
makes a separate agreement with a subcontractor, the surety for the contractor is not liable
to the subcontractor. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Putnam, 335 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA
1976).
192. FLA. STAT. § 713.02(6) (Supp. 1978). A subcontractor does not have an action
against the owner. Cohen v. Lunsford, 362 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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The owner's exemption under the payment bond was held in-
violate in Hawaiian Inn, Inc. v. Dunn. 193 Despite the existence of a
payment bond, a supplier of labor and materials attempted to fore-
close against the owner. The trial court properly dismissed this suit
since the action was not timely. Still, the supplier retained the
opportunity to assert its claim against the bond."4 Thereupon, the
trial court reinstituted the supplier's foreclosure action against the
owner. In holding that an owner's liability cannot be revived, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, maintained that the ex-
emption is "permanent, not transitory." 195
The payment bond must be executed by a surety authorized to
do business in Florida.1" A lienor has "a direct right of action on the
bond against the surety.""' In Alpha Electric Supply, Inc. v. F.
Feaster, Inc.,"'9 a materialman supplied materials to a subcontrac-
tor in connection with a construction job where the contractor had
furnished a payment bond. The trial judge dismissed a count in the
materialman's complaint which sought judgment against the surety
on the payment bond. The ground for this ruling was that the mate-
rialman had failed to join the subcontractor as an indispensable
party. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, hold-
ing that joinder of the subcontractor was unnecessary. 9 The word
"direct"m' not only links the lienor to the surety, it confirms the
exclusive liability of the principal and surety on a payment bond.
1. HOW THE EXISTENCE OF A PAYMENT BOND ALTERS STANDARD
MECHANICS' LIEN PROCEDURES
In the absence of a payment bond, a lienor is required to record
his claim of lien during the progress of work but not later than
ninety days after the final furnishing of services or materials by the
lienor.?" The lienor must bring an action to enforce the lien within
one year of recordation. 2 When a payment bond has been fur-
193. 342 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
194. A claim must be asserted against a bond within "1 year from the performance of
the labor or completion of delivery of the materials and supplies." FLA. STAT. § 713.23(1) n.1
(1977).
195. 342 So. 2d at 134. Furthermore, the original dismissal of the supplier's foreclosure
action was a final judgment. It was improper to reinstate litigation several months thereafter.
Id.
196. FLA. STAT. § 713.23(1) n.1 (1977).
197. Id.
198. 358 So. 2d 892.(Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
199. Id. at 894.
200. See text accompanying note 197 supra.
201. FLA. STAT. § 713.08(5) (1977).
202. Id. § 713.22(1) n.1.
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nished, the lienor must institute suit on the bond within one year
from the performance of labor or completion of delivery of materials
or supplies.0 3 In a case where a contractor and its surety argued that
a subcontractor had failed to perfect his lien by filing suit within
one year of a claim of lien, the court stated that the existence of a
payment bond precluded the necessity for perfecting the lien'"'
Thus, the requirements of sections 713.23 and 713.08 have been
tacitly held to be mutually exclusive.2"
2. 1977 AMENDMENTS.'
The 1977 amendment to section 713.23 of the Florida Statutes
strikingly changed the payment bond provisions, particularly in the
way the parties must establish a network of communication among
themselves. Under amended section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, a lienor zl' not in privity with the owner must send a notice
to owner before commencing work or not later than forty-five days
from commencing to furnish services." 7 Prior to the 1977 amend-
ments the owner did not need to respond. Now, however, the owner
must inform the lienor in writing of the existence of the payment
bond within ten days after receipt of this notice.2 8 This return notice
must include the name and address of the surety and principal. 2"1
Within forty-five days after commencing to furnish labor or
materials, a lienor not in privity with the contractor must inform
the contractor in writing that he will "look to the contractor's bond
for protection."210 In effect, the lienor tells the contractor that he is
aware of the existence of the payment bond and at some future time
will not seek to foreclose against the owner. If for some reason the
lienor is not notified of the payment bond through usual channels,"'
under amended section 713.23(1) he has forty-five days from the
203. Id. § 713.23 n.1.
204. E.E. Dean Snavely, Inc. v. Sullivan, 360 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
205. Id. at 452.
206. A laborer need not provide a notice to owner. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) n.1 (1977);
see note 13 supra. A laborer personally performs on the site and does not provide materials
or labor service of others. Id. § 713.01(9). Certain on-site personnel such as architects, engi-
neers and surveyors are not considered laborers. Id..
207. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977)). The
purpose is to inform the owners of the identity of potential lien claimants. The owner is spared
from unanticipated claims later. 2 R. BOYER, supra note 14, at 1096.
208. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 10 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.23 (1977)).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. A lienor may also learn of a payment bond when reference to the bond is incorpo-
rated in the owner's notice of commencement. See FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1)(e) (1977). This
notice is posted conspicuously at the site. Id. See also id. § 713.01(24).
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time he learns of the payment bond to serve the preliminary notice
on the contractor."2 As a prerequisite to suit, a lienor not in privity
with the contractor must send the contractor a second notice stating
that he has performed labor or delivered materials for which he has
not been paid.' Where, for example, a materialman has supplied
a subcontractor and has not been paid, that materialman must
deliver both notices to the contractor as a prerequisite to bringing
suit.
There are three indications that the materialman must comply
exactly with the two-notice requirement. First, amended section
713.23(1) of the Florida Statutes specifically establishes both no-
tices as a condition precedent to suit."' Second, section 713.37 of the
Florida Statutes requires courts to construe strictly the Mechanics'
Lien Law."t 5 Finally, the notice to contractor by a lienor not in
privity under section 713.23(1) of the Florida Statutes, parallels the
notice to owner by a lienor not in privity under amended section
713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes.2" Formerly, failure to send a
notice to owner merely resulted in a loss of priority, rather than the
forefeiture of the right to bring an action. 17 The 1977 amendment
to section 713.06(3)(c)4 of the Florida Statutes changed this result
so that a failure to file a notice to owner will preclude the lienor from
obtaining a mechanic's lien."' Similarly, a materialman who fails
to follow the requirements of section 713.23(1) may not argue that
he has merely lost prioity. He has irretrievably lost his right of
action under the statute.
B. Transferring Liens to Security
An owner may transfer a claim of lien to a security in the form
of either money or a bond. 1' The owner mdy seek the transfer in
order to avoid a cloud upon his title. The money or bond, intended
to pay any judgment rendered in favor of the lienor, must be in an
amount equal to that demanded by the claim of lien.21' The clerk
prepares a certificate showing the transfer and mails a copy to the
212. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 10 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.23 (1977)).
213. Id. The requirements of this notice to the contractor are retained from the former
version of section 713.23.
214. Id.
215. FLA. STAT. § 713.37 (1977). This provision was added to the Mechanics' Lien Law
by the 1977 Florida Legislature. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 15.
216. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (1977))..
217. See Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969).
218. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(c)(4) (1977)).




lienor.12' Filing the certificate of transfer releases the property from
the lien 22 and restores the marketability of the property. The
owner's right to transfer is then unrestricted.
23
The existence of a transfer bond does not relieve a lienor of its
procedural obligations under the Mechanics' Lien Law. In each of
three recent cases in which the lienor neglected to follow the statute,
it was argued unsuccessfully that section 713.24 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975) permitted noncompliance with the other provisions of
the lien law.
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Accel, Inc.224 the subcontractor
foreclosed on a claim of lien. The contractor transferred the lien to
a security.225 After an adverse judgment below, the surety on the
transfer bond appealed and argued that the subcontractor had
failed to allege and prove that it had given notice to the owner
pursuant to section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1975). In
reversing the trial court and finding for the surety, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, maintained that "the claimant
must prove all of the conditions precedent to the perfection and
enforcement of that lien." '
The District Court of Appeal, First District, invoked the same
"conditions precedent" language in finding against the lienor in
Corry Construction Co. v. Hector Construction Cos.227 In Corry, the
lienor had previously won a judgment against Will-O-Wick, Inc.,
the original owner. The lienor was granted leave to file a further
complaint against the surety on the transfer bond. The surety de-
fended by showing that the record title holder of the property was a
limited partnership named Will-O-Wick Apartments. The lienor
had sent its notice to owner to the corporation, but thereafter, in
April, 1973, the corporation deeded the property to the limited part-
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Riviera Beach Partnership, Ltd. v. S.I. Goldman Mechanical Contractor, 345 So.
2d 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In Riviera, the owner transferred the lien to a bond after the
foreclosure suit was filed, but before service was perfected. Summary judgment in favor of
the lienor was granted. The court held that there was no time limit on the transfer. In
reversing the lienor's summary judgment, the court implicitly held that once the transfer was
made the owner was an improper target for recovery. The lienor should have amended its
pleadings in acknowledgment of the transfer. See 2 S. RAKUSIN, supra note 75, ch. 18, at 11.
224. 354 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
225. Any person having an interest in the real property may transfer the lien. FLA. STAT.
§ 713.24(1) n.1 (1977). In this case the subcontractor argued that it need not prove it had
furnished notice to owner because the contractor, not the owner, had acquired the transfer
bond.
226. 354 So. 2d at 425.
227. 363 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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nership. The lienor filed its claim of lien in May, 1973. The lienor
argued that its notice to owner, which preceded the conveyance,
effectively initiated its foreclosure. The court rejected this argument
and found that the conveyance took priority over the claim of lien
under section 713.07(3) of the Florida Statutes."8
Concomitantly, the lienor had argued that the existence of the
transfer bond relieved it of the requirement to establish a valid
claim of lien against the record title holder.22' The transfer bond
was, by its terms, intended to pay any judgments in satisfaction of
a claim of lien. Since the lienor had already won a judgment against
the wrong party, the corporation, the lienor maintained that the
bond covered any judgment on the claim of lien beyond that of a
judgment on a claim of lien against the rightful owner. The First
District refused to accept the lienor's interpretation of the bond's
function. Having failed to establish the conditions precedent to a
valid lien, the lienor could not receive the benefits of the bond.13°
A subcontractor's confusion as to the meaning of the Mechan-
ics' Lien Law caused it to forfeit its right of action in Vic Tanny,
Inc. v. Fred McGilvray, Inc.nl In this case, Vic Tanny of Florida,
Inc. was a lessee of real property owned by Monumental Properties,
Inc. Vic Tanny International was listed in the lease as the trade
name of the tenant. McGilvray, the subcontractor, filed its claim of
lien. In response, Vic Tanny of Florida, Inc., as principal, and Reli-
ance Insurance, as surety, filed a transfer bond. The principal and
surety also filed a notice of contest of lien which required the sub-
contractor to foreclose within sixty days.u2 Within sixty days the
subcontractor filed a foreclosure action listing three defendants in-
cluding Vic Tanny International, but omitting both Vic Tanny of
Florida, Inc. and Reliance Insurance. As no suit was filed against
the principal and surety, the clerk returned the transfer bond after
sixty days hid elapsed.
On appeal, the subcontractor contended that section 713.24(4)
of the Florida Statutes leaves the door open for suit against defen-
228. The conveyance was recorded prior to the time the lien attached. FLA. STAT. §
713.07(3) (1977). A lien attaches as of the time of the recordation of the owner's notice of
commencement and, if there is no notice of commencement, as of the time the claim of lien
is recorded. Id. § 713.07(2).
229. 363 So. 2d at 1128.
230. Id.
231. 348 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
232. An owner or agent may shorten to 60 days the time in which a subcontractor must




dants other than the principal and surety.21 Apparently, the sub-
contractor argued that once the sixty days had lapsed and the secu-
rity was returned, suit could be brought against other parties. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, ruled that section
713.22(2), read in pari materia with section 713.24, operates as a
statute of limitation1u
In Fidelity, Corry and McGilvray, the lienors forfeited their
claims because they had failed to grasp the complexities of the
statute. Where once courts would have construed the statute liber-
ally to protect the small businessman, they no longer are permitted
to do so. 235 The result has been harsh. In Corry, for instance, the
subcontractor did not know of a paper transfer of ownership and
therefore failed to join the proper defendant."' The subcontractor
and materialman must now be aware of their multifarious obliga-
tions under the statute and how those obligations are intertwined
with those of the other participants in a construction project. The
courts, particularly where bonds are furnished, are no longer in-
clined to forgive a procedural misstep.27
C. Concurrent Payment and Transfer Bonds
Despite the existence of a payment bond exempting an owner
from liability, subcontractors invariably seek to foreclose claims of
lien against the owner. Even though the lien may be legally invalid,
it can still place a cloud upon the owner's title. In Resnick Devel-
opers South, Inc. v. Clerici, Inc.,231 the owner transferred the lien to
security pursuant to section 713.24 of the Florida Statutes (1975).
The District Couut of Appeal, Fourth District, recognized that the
233. 348 So. 2d at 650.
234. The court cited the following provision:
If no proceeding to enforce a transferred lien shall be commenced within the time
specified in § 713.22 or if it appears that the transferred lien has been satisfied of
record, the clerk shall return said security upon request of the person depositing
or filing the same, or the insurer.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.24(4) (1971)).
235. This is due to the new statutory provision which requires strict construction. FLA.
STAT. § 713.37 (1977).
236. It was especially harsh considering that the lienor had demonstrated the merit of
its case by winning a judgment against the former owner.
237. In one recent case, however, a procedural misstep was not fatal. In American Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Davis Water & Waste Indus., Inc., 358 So.22d 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the
lienor failed to join the surety on a transfer bond as a defendant. The lienor finally sought to
join the surety two and one-half years after the claim of lien was recorded and two years and
two months after the transfer to bond. Because a suit was already in existence within one
year of the claim of lien pursuant to FiA. STAT. § 713.22(1) (1977), joinder of the surety
thereafter did not violate the intent of the statute. 358 So. 2d at 226.
238. 340 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
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subcontractor did not have a right to file a claim of lien against the
owner since the owner was without exception exempted by the pay-
ment bond as against a subcontractor.2 3' Furthermore, the owner
had a right to utilize the transfer bond as a prompt device for remov-
ing the encumbrance." '
When the lienor improperly attempts to foreclose against an
owner of property protected by a payment bond, the owner may
choose among several courses of action. Posting a transfer bond will
immediately clear the encumbrance. Alternatively, the owner may
seek to discharge the lien. " ' In Goldberger v. United Plumbing &
Heating Co., ' the owner filed a complaint to discharge a lien and
the subcontractor made no response." ' By not responding, the lien
of the subcontractor was subject to automatic cancellation. '
The court in Goldberger noted that when the lienor files his lien
foreclosure action first, the owner may raise the payment bond ei-
ther as an affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss."' In dictum
in the Resnick case, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
condoned the affirmative defense approach. ' One year later in
Hunt Truck Sales & Service, Inc. v. Bonanza Construction, Inc.,"4 7
the Fourth District elaborated by stating that if the payment bond
defense appears on the face of the foreclosure complaint, the owner
may raise the defense by motion to dismiss. In Hunt, an order
granting a motion to dismiss was reversed, however, because the
owner failed to allege that the bond attached to the complaint
stated the amount of the original contract price. 48 In other words,
239. Id. at 1197. See also Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Concreform Co., 351 So. 2d 1046
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In Resnick, the Fourth District receded from the language in Schleifer
v. All-Shores Constr. & Supply Co., 260 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), which suggested
that a subcontractor may sue on the transfer bond.
240. The court in Resnick permitted the use of an otherwise unnecessary bond to remove
an encumbrance without channeling liability to the bond. A similar approach was taken in
Corry Constr. Co. v. Hector Constr. Cos., 363 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see text
accompanying note 226 supra. A payment bond was not at issue here. Instead, the lienor had
erroneously filed a claim of lien against the former owner. The present owner, not party to
the suit, executed the transfer bond (supposedly to remove the cloud on its title, but perhaps
in anticipation of liability). The court, however, would not permit a claim of lien on the
transfer bond because the lien was improper under the Mechanics' Lien Law.
241. FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1977).
242. 358 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
243. Under FLA.-STAT. § 713.21(4) (1977), the lienor has 20 days to show cause why he
has failed to bring an action to enforce his lien.
244. No notice or hearing is required before cancellation; the summons attached to the
owner's complaint will serve as notice to the lienor. 358 So. 2d at 863.
245. Id.
246. 340 So. 2d at 1196-97.
247. 353 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
248. This is an essential element of FLA. STAT, § 713.23(1) n.1 (1977).
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the court required assurance that the payment bond had met the
conditions of section 713.23 of the Florida Statutes before it would
dismiss the action.
249
The court in Goldberger apparently did not consider the court's
suggestion in Hunt that the pleadings should reflect a proper pay-
ment bond as a condition to a motion to dismiss. In Goldberger, the
Hunt rule was given without reference to this suggestion.," Thus, it
is difficult to discern exactly where the Fourth District stands. At
least this court will consider a motion to dismiss. The District Court
of Appeal, Second District, appears to have foreclosed that possibil-
ity in Alpha Electric Supply, Inc. v. F. Feaster, Inc. 5' There, the
court held that a motion to dismiss was premature since there had
been no allegations that the payment bond conformed with the
statute. The court said payment bonds may be interposed as an
affirmative defense when it is shown that the payment bond meets
the statutory requirements.2
D. Notice of Bond
In the 1977 amendments to the payment bond provision, the
legislature gave the owner a method by which to publicize his ex-
emption from liability under a payment bond and to avoid unneces-
sary suit. Amended section 713.23(2) of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides that every lien accruing subsequent to the exemption of the
bond shall be transferred to the bond.253 The transfer is recorded by
a notice of bond and a copy is sent to the lienor.254 The transfer
produces the same effect as that of a section 713.24 transfer to
security, i.e., the owner's title is immediately unencumbered.
249. Perhaps in this instance a presumption could have been made that the statutory
requirements had been met. If the bond which the plaintiff-lienor attaches to his complaint
represents an amount lower than the original contract price, then the bond is not statutorily
valid. The plaintiff would want to expose the invalidity of the bond in its complaint as a
means of circumventing the owner's alleged exemption.
250. The Hunt rule as given was: "If the payment bond defense appears on the face of
the foreclosure complaint, the owner may raise the defense by a motion to dismiss." 358 So.
2d at 863 (citing Hunt Truck Sales & Serv. v. Bonanza Constr., Inc., 353 So. 2d 612 (Fla.
4th DCA 1977).
251. 358 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
252. Id. at 894.
253. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 10 (amending FLA. STAT. § 71 323 (1977), and adding
id. § 713.23(2)). This provision does not encompass a contractor's lien to which the owner's
exemption is always inapplicable.
254. Id.
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V. THE EQUITABLE LIEN
An equitable lien is a nonstatutory lien which can be imposed
upon real property, undisbursed construction loan proceeds, or spe-
cial funds by one who has furnished materials or services in connec-
tion with the improvement of real property.255 It affords an addi-
tional remedy to one whose efforts to perfect his statutory rights
have proved to be unavailing. The mere fact that one has not been
paid for services or materials which have been incorporated into an
improvement, however, is not sufficient to establish an equitable
lien."' The party seeking to establsh an equitable lien must meet
specific requirements if he is to succeed in his effort to recover for
the value of services or materials furnished to the improvement.21
A. Crane Co. v. Fine
Prior to 1969, Florida courts were divided on the issue of
whether a mechanic's lien claimant who had failed to perfect his
statutory remedies was barred from establishing an equitable lien.2U
In Crane Co. v. Fine,259 the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the
conflict by reaffirming the rule that 'one who has performed serv-
ices or furnished materials in the improvement of real property is
not limited to proceeding under the mechanics' lein law, but may
proceed to establish an equitable lien on the property in ques-
tion."' 60
In Crane, a materialman furnished supplies to a plumbing sub-
contractor who, after incorporating the supplies into the project,
became insolvent and abandoned the plumbing job. At the time the
plumbing subcontractor abandoned the project, the general con-
tractor held $15,000 in a special fund for the plumbing subcontrac-
tor under a percentage hold-back clause in the construction loan
agreement. The materialman filed suit to enforce his claim against
this fund. Neither the notice to owner26' nor the claim of lien,262
255. See generally 2 S. RAKUSIN, note 75 supra, ch. 27, at 1-38; Boyer & Kutun, The
Equitable Lien in Florida, 20 U. MtAMi L. REV. 731 (1966); Note, Lien Rights and Construc-
tion Lending: Responsibilities and Liabilities in Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 411, 425-33 (1977).
256. Charter Dev. Corp. v. Eversole, 342 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
257. See text accompanying notes 264-69 infra.
258. See, e.g., Green v. Putnam, 93 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1957) (failure to exercise
statutory lien remedies does not bar establishment of equitable lien); Kimbrell v. Fink, 78
So. 2d 96, 98-99 (Fla. 1955) (failure to exercise statutory lien remedies bars establishment of
equitable lien).
259. 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969).
260. Id. at 147 (quoting Green v. Putnam, 93 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1957)).




however, was timely filed.
After first determining that the materialman was not precluded
from attempting to establish an equitable lien by virtue of having
filed to perfect his statutory lien remedies, the court examined the
record to see if there were "special and peculiar equities" sufficient
to support the materialman's equitable lien claim.
The supreme court noted that the $15,000 fund held by the
contractor was due and owing to the plumbing subcontractor for
work it had completed at the time of abandonment. Furthermore,
the fund was held solely as security for the payment of the amounts
due to the plumbing contractor's materialmen and any damages
sustained as as result of a breach of the plumbing subcontract.
Since no other lienor claimed any portion of the fund and since the
cost of completion of the plumbing project did not exceed the re-
maining amount payable under the contract, the contractor had no
rights to the fund. Retention of the $15,000 fund would unjustly
enrich the contractor. Thus, the court determined that permitting
the materialman to foreclose his lien against the fund would not
force the owner to pay twice for the same improvement. The court
held that "because of the special and peculiar equities shown by the
record in this particular case, the plaintiff should not be foreclosed
from seeking an equitable lien merely because he was entitled to but
failed to perfect his statutory materialman's lien."" 3
B. Requirements for an Equitable Lien
A lien claimant who has failed to perfect his statutory remedies
and seeks to establish an equitable lien must specifically request
relief in the form of an equitable lien," 4 allege the inadequacy of his
remedy at law,"' allege that the fund or property upon which the
equitable lien is to be imposed is in the possession of or owned by
the defendant,2" and allege ultimate facts which support the impo-
sition of an equitable lien in his favor. 7 Under the Crane doctrine
the facts must reveal "special and peculiar equities" which justify
imposing an equitable lien."' More recent cases indicate that the
262. See id. § 84.081 (1965) (current version at id. § 713.08 & n.1 (1977)).
263. 221 So. 2d at 149.
264. Charter Dev. Corp. v. Eversole, 342 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla.,lst DCA 1977)).
265. Cohen v. Lunsford, 362 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Architectonics, Inc. v.
Salem-Am. Ventures, Inc., 350 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
266. 2 S. RAKUSIN, note 75 supra, ch. 27, at 37.
267. Id. ch. 27, at 37-38.
268. 221 So. 2d at 149. A mere allegation that the lienor's materials have been incorpo-
rated into the improvement will not meet the special and peculiar equities test. Charter Dev.
Corp. v. Eversole, 342 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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lien claimant must show that he has been prevented from exercising
his statutory remedies because of fraud, misrepresentation or af-
firmative deception by the party against whom the lien is sought to
be imposed. '
C. Equitable Liens on Real Property
An equitable lien may be imposed against real property as a
means of enforcing an owner's obligation to one who has improved
that property.2 ° Although the lien claimant must ordinarily plead
each of the elements of the cause of action, where the lien claimant
is unable to show fraud or misrepresentation by the owner, he may
have an equitable lien if there is an agreement relating to the prop-
erty which contemplates use of the property as security.' Further-
more, Florida courts have permitted a lien claimant to establish an
equitable lien where the lien claimant was mistaken as to the owner-
ship of the property,"' although a lien claimant's mere confusion as
to the proper party defendant is insufficient for the imposition of an
equitable lien. "3
Several recent Florida decisions demonstrate the variety of fac-
tual situations which can give rise to an equitable lien. In
Architectonics, Inc. v. Salem-American Ventures, Inc.,"' the owner
induced the lienor not to file a claim of lien, promised to guarantee
payment on the contract, and agreed to subject the property to any
claim of lien later filed by the lienor.7 5 Nevertheless, the owner
refused to pay the lienor the balance due on the contract. The lienor
then brought an action against the owner which included a count
claiming an equitable lien. The trial court dismissed the equitable
lien count for failure to state a cause of action. The District Court
269. See, e.g., Giffen Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Assoc., Inc., 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978) (lenders must be guilty of fraud or misrepresentation, or gain inequitable advan-
tage for imposition of trust on undisbursed construction funds); Chase Manhattan Bank v.
S/D Enterprises, Inc., 353 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam); Rosen v. Fierro, 340
So. 2d 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (award of equitable lien must be predicated on factors such
as mistake or material misrepresentation); J.G. Plumbing Serv., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage
Co., 329 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1976) (equitable
lien imposed when construction lenders, by fraud or misrepresentation, falsely advise materi-
almen or subcontractors that mortgage is not in default).
270. Architectonics, Inc. v. Salem-Am. Ventures, Inc., 350 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977).
271. Id.
272. 2 S. RAKUSIN, note 75 supra, ch. 27, at 13 (citing Gottesman v. Owen, 172 So. 2d
257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Frank v. Groo, 176 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)).
273. Vic Tanny, Inc. v. Fred McGilvray, Inc., 348 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
274. 350 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
275. Id. at 583.
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of Appeal, Second District, reversed, finding that the lienor had
failed to establish and perfect its statutory mechanic's lien because
he had relied upon the owner's false promises of payment."'
"Imposition of an equitable lien upon specific property is particu-
larly appropriate where the creditor has lost security in that prop-
erty in reliance upon the false representations of one who later
claims a superior interest in the property." '77
It is clear, however, that a mere misstatement of fact by one
claiming a superior interest in the property is not sufficient to justify
the imposition of an equitable lien. In Indiana Mortgage & Realty
Investors v. Peacock Construction Co.,27 the contractor attempted
to establish an equitable lien superior to the rights of the mortgage
lender who had filed suit to foreclose a mortgage on which the owner
had defaulted. The mortgage lender's loan disbursements represent-
ative had stated to the contractor that there was enough money in
the construction loan fund to cover the amount then owed the con-
tractor by the owner. When the project was completed, however,
there were no remaining funds with which to pay the contractor.
Accordingly, the contractor argued that it should be granted an
equitable lien superior to the interest of the mortgage lender. The
District Court of Appeal, Second District, disagreed. It found no
promise to retain monies for the contractor. No funds had been
disbursed in violation of the loan agreement. The lender had not
induced the contractor to continue work on the project. The Second
District stated:
[T]he only duty flowing from the mortgagee in this posture was
not to "affirmatively deceive" the contractor to his detriment.
The mistaken observation that there seemed to be enough money
left in undisbursed loan funds to complete the project falls short
of what we contemplated as "affirmative deception" equivalent
to fraud and misrepresentation which would justify the imposi-
tion of an equitable lien.80
A recent decision by the District Court of Appeal, First District,
suggests that the requirement of fraud, misrepresentation or affirm-
ative deception need not be present to impose an equitable lien in
favor of a privity lienor. In Divine Homes, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co.,
28
1
a contractor installed an underground electrical distribution system
276. Id. at 584.
277. Id.
278. 348 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
279. Id. at 60.
280. Id. at 60-61.
281. 352 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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on a subdivision owned by the defendant developer. The developer
did not pay the contractor but transferred all but one of the lots to
individual purchasers. The remaining lot was then conveyed to the
president of the defendant corporation. The contractor brought an
action to impose an equitable lien on the lot owned by the devloper's
president for the full value of the improvements to all the lots in the
subdivision. The First District permitted the contractor to establish
an equitable lien on this lot, stating that "[t]he right to impress
and foreclose an equitable lien is not limited to one particular set
of circumstances. It may arise from any combination of facts and
circumstances, the totality of which establish a right of a special
nature to charge realty with improvement costs." '82 The defendant's
"subterfuge of corporate conveyance" '83 did not defeat the contrac-
tor's equitable lien claim even though the court did not hold the
conveyance by the developer to be fraudulent.
D. Equitable Liens on Undisbursed Loan Funds
Where the owner of a construction project has defaulted upon
mortgage payments and the lender has initiated a foreclosure ac-
tion, lien claimants have attempted to impose equitable liens upon
undisbursed construction loan funds. 8 Lien claimants have pro-
ceeded on the theory that they had an interest in the undisbursed
funds prior to the time foreclosure proceedings were instituted. Gen-
erally, the requirements for imposing an equitable lien on undis-
bursed construction loan funds are the same as those for imposing
an equitable lien on real property. 5
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. SID Enterprises, Inc.,'s creditors
of the owner of a construction project sought to impose an equitable
lien upon the mortgage lender's undisbursed construction loan
funds. The court refused to grant the creditors an equitable lien,
concluding that factors such as fraud, affirmative deception or ma-
terial 'misrepresentation must be present in order to impose an equi-
table lien.287 Since there was no finding by the chancellor that the
mortgage lender had defrauded or affirmatively deceived the credi-
282. Id. at 116.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., J.G. Plumbing Serv., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So. 2d 393 (Fla.
2d DCA 1976); Morgen-Oswood & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Invs., 323 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
285. See text accompanying notes 264-69 supra.
286. 353 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
287. Id. at 133.
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tors of the owner, the trial court erred in imposing an equitable
lien .28
Recent cases indicate that in some circumstances a lienor will
be permitted to establish an equitable lien on undisbursed loan
funds even though there has been no act of fraud, misrepresentation
or deception by the lender.89 In Giffen Industries, Inc. v. Southeast-
ern Associates, Inc.,210 a contractor-supplier filed a complaint to
foreclose a mechanic's lien, impose an equitable lien on the owner's
real property, and impose an equitable lien on undisbursed loan
funds held by the mortgage lender. Although the mechanic's lien
claim of the contractor was barred by a notice of lis pendens2" filed
by the mortgage lender in its foreclosure suit, the court found merit
in the contractor's equitable lien count.
The court observed that ordinarily,
[u]nless there is fraud on the part of the mortgagee or unless a
mortgagee has in some way induced a materialman or laborer to
forego taking action which would have protected his interests,
such materialman or laborer would have no claim for an equitable
lien superior to the mortgage lien of the mortgagee .... 2
The fact that a mortgage lender continues to release loan funds to
the owner for continuation of construction at a time when the owner
is in default is not a sufficient basis for establishing an equitable lien
on undisbursed loan funds where the mortgagee forecloses on an
uncompleted project.
2 3
If at the time of foreclosure, however, the construction project
is completed and the mortgage lender still retains undisbursed
funds, the equities demand a different result. In such a situation the
lender can foreclose upon a completed building, even though it has
not disbursed all of the funds earmarked for completion of the pro-
ject. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth ,District, has held that
under such circumstances a contractor who has completed the con-
struction in accordance with his construction contract is entitled to
an equitable lien against the undisbursed balance of construction
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Morgen-Oswood & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Invs., 323 So. 2d
684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
290. 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
291. The filing of a notice of lis pendens is a bar to foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. FLA.
STAT. § 48.23(1)(b) (1977); see Cleveland Trust Co. v. Ousley Sod Co., 351 So. 2d 58 (Fla.
4th DCA 1977).
292. 357 So. 2d at 219.
293. See J.G. Plumbing Serv., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA
1976).
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loan funds.2 '
In Giffen Industries, the court considered the completion of the
project crucial to whether the claimant was entitled to undisbursed
loan funds."9 5 If the project were completed at the time of foreclo-
sure, the lien claimant would be able to impose an equitable lien
on any undisbursed loan funds under the holding of Morgen-Oswood
& Associates, Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors.29 If the pro-
ject were not completed, however, the lien claimant would be re-
quired to show that it had failed to perfect its statutory remedies
as a result of the fraud, misrepresentation or affirmative deception
of the mortgage lender in order to establish an equitable lien. Since
it was unclear from the record whether the project had been com-
pleted at the time of foreclosure or whether there were any undis-
bursed loan funds upon completion, the court in Giffen Industries
remanded the case for further proceedings. "
Similarly, in Blosam Contractors, Inc. v. Republic Mortgage
Investors,"9 8 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, permit-
ted a contractor to impose an equitable lien on a retainage fund held
by the mortgage lender where the construction had been completed
at the time the lender initiated his foreclosure suit. In Blosam, the
mortgage lender had agreed to pay the contractor one-half the re-
tainage fund upon completion of the condominium project and the
remaining one-half of the fund upon the sale of the first fifty-six
units. The owner defaulted on mortgage payments after the con-
struction was completed but before any of the units were sold, so
the lender refused to pay the contractor the remainder of the retain-
age fund. The court found the equitable lien to be a particularly
appropriate remedy in view of the injustice which would otherwise
have been imposed on the contractor.
299
A lien claimant's success in obtaining an equitable lien often
depends upon the nature of the property upon which he seeks to
impose the lien and his relationship with the owner. A lien claimant
seeking to impose an equitable lien on undisbursed loan funds need
not prove fraud, misrepresentation or affirmative deception by the
lender if he can show that at the time the lender instituted foreclo-
sure, the construction project was complete and construction loan
294. Morgen-Oswood & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Invs., 323 So. 2d 684 (Fla.
4th DCA 1975).
295. 357 So. 2d at 221.
296. 323 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
297. 357 So. 2d at 221.
298. 353 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
299. Id. at 1228.
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funds remained undisbursed.3 " For the lien claimant seeking to
impose an equitable lien on real property, the existence of a privity
relationship 0' with the owner of the property is crucial. Recent cases
suggest that unless a lien claimant who is not in privity with the
owner can show fraud, misrepresentation or other affirmative decep-
tion, an equitable lien will not be imposed on the owner's prop-
erty. °0 The lien claimant in contractual privity with the owner or
whose relationship and course of dealing with the owner give rise to
a "right of a special nature, ' '13 3 need not show fraud, misrepresen-
tation or affirmative deception, but only that special and peculiar
equities3°1 exist which entitle him to impress and foreclose an equi-
table lien on the owner's property.3"
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes provides:
In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services
of his attorney for trial and appeal to be determined by the court,
which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable
actions.3"
Although the command of the statute is straightforward, 301 ques-
300. Giffen Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Assoc., Inc., 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978);
Blosam Constr., Inc. v. Republic Mortgage Invs., 353 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). See
also Morgan v. Goodwin, 355 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
301. Contractual privity is not required. See Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla.
1969); Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925); Devine Homes, Inc. v. Gulf Power
Co., 352 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Imler Earthmovers, Inc. v. Schatten, 240 So.
2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); Carter v. Suggs, 190 So. 2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
302. Architectonics, Inc. v. Salem-Am. Ventures, Inc., 350 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977); Indiana Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Peacock Constr. Co., 348 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977); see cases cited in note 269 supra. See also Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 361 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1978).
303. Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145, 149 (Fla. 1969).
304. Id. at 147.
305. Id. at 149; Devine Homes, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 352 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977). See also Imler Earthmovers, Inc. v. Schatten, 240 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970);
Blanchard v. Continental Mortgage Invs., 217 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); O.H. Thoma-
son Builders' Supplies, Inc. v. Goodwin, 152 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
306. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 n.1 (1977). The 1977 Florida Legislature amended this section
to provide that attorney's fees incurred on appeal are also recoverable by the prevailing party.
1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 11. This amendment conforms with FLA. STAT. § 59.46 (1977),
which provides that whenever any statute or contract provides for the payment of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party, this shall include the payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party on appeal. See Florida Glass & Mirror Co. v. Economy King Equip. Co., 353 So. 2d
596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
307. The statutory mandate is clear: attorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing
party. When the legislature amended the section in 1977, however, it created unnecessary
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tions arise concerning the propriety of awarding attorney's fees in a
number of situations2'15
A. Prevailing Party
Any lien claimant who successfully maintains a cause of action
to enforce his statutory rights is a "prevailing party" within the
meaning of section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes."9 Similarly, one
who successfully resists a claim for a mechanic's lien is a prevailing
party and entitled to recover attorney's fees."" A lien claimant who
prevails in his foreclosure action and successfully defends against a
counterclaim to discharge the lien is entitled to attorney's fees for
both his claim and the defense of the counterclaim."'
uncertainty by adding to the end of the statute the phrase "as allowed in equitable actions."
1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 11. It is not clear what the legislature intended by this apparent
afterthought, but presumably this language does not contradict the statutory directive that
attorney's fees be awarded to the prevailing party.
308. Suits brought against a surety to enforce a claim of lien against a payment bond
are governed by FLA. STAT. §§ 627.428(1), .756(2) (1977).
Section 627.428(1) provides:
Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state
against an insurer and in favor of an insured or the named beneficiary under a
policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court, or, in the event of an
appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court, shall
adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a
reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured's or beneficiary's attorney
prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.
This section is made applicable to suits brought against surety insurers by lien claimants and
others by § 627.756(2), which provides:
Section 627.428 (attorney fee) shall also apply as to suits brought by owners,
subcontractors, laborers and material men against a surety insurer under pay-
ment or performance bonds written by the insurer under the Laws of Florida to
indemnify such owners, subcontractors, laborers and material men against pecu-
niary loss by breach of a building or construction contract; except, that the
amount to be so recovered for fees or compensation of such a plaintiff's attorney
shall not be more than 12.5 percent of the amount which the judgment or decree
awards such plaintiff under the bond (exclusive of the costs of suit and attorney
fees or compensation), nor shall it be less than $100 where the judgment or decree
is for more than $500 nor less than $50 where the judgment or decree is $500 or
less. Such owners, subcontractors, laborers and material men shall be deemed to
be "insureds" or "beneficiaries" for the purposes of this section.
Both of these sections have been repealed by the legislature effective July 1, 1982. 1976 Fla.
Laws ch. 76-168, § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 627.428(1), .756(2) (1975)). For a case applying
the 12.5% limitation to a successful suit, see CFW Constr. Co. v. Richardson Elec. Co., 364
So. 2d 854 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
309. See, e.g., Hawaiian Inn, Inc. v. Robert Myers Painting, Inc., 363 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978) (per curiam); Florida City Dev. Corp. v. Benrus Constr., Inc., 362 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
310. Charter Dev. Corp. v. Eversole, 342 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Falovitch v.
Gunn & Gunn Constr. Co., 348 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
311. Peacock Constr. Co. v. Gould, 351 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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In Winnie v. Buckhater,1 a lien claimant brought an action
to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The owner counterclaimed for breach
of contract. The trial court determined that neither party had estab-
lished his claim by a preponderance of the evidence and held that
each party should be responsible for his own attorney's fees. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the
owner was entitled to recover attorney's fees as the prevailing party
"since he successfully resisted the mechanics' lien foreclosure action
and was not found otherwise liable for damages in the same case.""'
Presumably, if the owner had been found liable for breach of con-
tract, he would not have been able to recover attorney's fees even
though the lien claimant did not succeed in his mechanic's lien
claim.
In First Atlantic Building Corp. v. Neubauer Construction
Co., '" a contractor brought an action against the owner both to
enforce a mechanic's lien and for breach of contract. The contractor
was unsuccessful in his mechanic's lien claim but obtained a money
judgment against the owner for breach of contract. On appeal the
owner argued that it was entitled to attorney's fees because the
contractor was unsuccessful in its mechanic's lien claim and be-
cause of a contractual provision."' The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, rejected the owner's arguments finding that since
the contractor proved that the owner breached the contract, the
contractor, not the owner, became the prevailing party. " The court
312. 362 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. lt DCA 1978).
313. Id. at 1015. The owner was entitled to attorney's fees in connection with the me-
chanic's lien aspect of the case. The owner could not recover the attorney's fees expended in
connection with his unsuccessful counterclaim for breach of contract.
314. 352 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
315. The clause in the contract provided:
"17. In the event that any action is instituted against the Owner either by
the Contractor or by any persons claiming privity with him such as material men
or laborers, then and in that event, the Contractor shall be responsible for the
payment of reasonable attorney's fees expended by the Owner in defending such.
In the event the Owner institutes or maintains an action to enforce this Agree-
ment or any part hereof or any obligations covered under this Agreement, either
in an original action or in an action brought by anyone else, then the Contractor
agrees to pay an attorney's fee to the Owner."
Quoted in id. at 105-06.
316. Id. at 105. To the exterit that First Atlantic suggests that an unsuccessful lien
claimant is a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees by virtue' of having obtained a
judgment against the owner for breach of contract, the decision is incorrect. In Emery v.
International Glass & Mfg., Inc., 249 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971), the case cited by the
court in First Atlantic in its discussion of attorney's fees, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, specifically stated: "[A] claimant is not entitled to attorney's fees under the section
before us, notwithstanding that he ultimately prevails in the case, unless the mode and
substance of his recovery is expressly provided for within the lien law itself." Id. at 500
(emphasis in original).
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also refused to enforce the clause in the contract awarding the owner
attorney's fees, stating "[i]t would be an anomaly to permit a party
who breaches a contract to rely on the same contract to reimburse
it for expenses, such as attorney's fees, which arose out of the
breach.""'
When Winnie and First Atlantic are read together, it becomes
apparent that the owner is not entitled to attorney's fees even if he
successfully resists a mechanic's lien claim if it also appears that he
is otherwise liable for damages to the lienor in the same case.' 8 In
such a situation neither party is entitled to attorney's fees under
section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes.
319
The question of whether a lien claimant who has been offered
a settlement can be a prevailing party for purposes of section 713.29
has been recently addressed by the District Courts of Appeal, Sec-
ond and Fourth Districts. In Monde Investments No. 2, Inc. v. R.D.
Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc.,3 10 a nonprivity lien claimant brought
an action to foreclose a lien against the owner of a building around
which it had installed paving. Although the owner had retained ten
percent of the original contract price as required by statute, 2' 1 this
amount was insufficient to cover the amount of the lien. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the lien claimant was only entitled to a pro rata portion
of the retained funds, finding that the owner had made no improper
payments within the meaning of section 713.06(3)(h).2 2 Neverthe-
317. 350 So. 2d at 106.
318. Conversely, if a lien claimaint proves his entitlement to a mechanic's lien but loses
on a counterclaim for breach of contract resulting in an affirmative judgment being entered
in favor of the owner he is "otherwise liable for damages" and should not be allowed to recover
attorney's fees under the holding of the Winnie case. The Winnie and First Atlantic cases
raise numerous questions about the propriety of awarding attorney's fees in multicount ac-
tions between lienor and owner when each party prevails on one or more of the counts.
319. Emery v. International Glass & Mfg., Inc., 249 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971).
320. 344 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
321. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(5) (1975). This section was amended by the legislature in
1977. The new section, which became effective on July 1, 1978, provides: "The owner shall
retain the final payment due under the direct contract that shall not be disbursed until the
contractor's affidavit under paragraph (d)l of this section has been furnished to the owner."
1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 5.
322. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(h) (1975), which provides:
When the owner has properly retained all sums 'equired in this section to be
retained but has otherwise made improper payments, the owner's real property
shall be liable to all laborers, subcontractors, subsubcontractors and materialmen
complying with this chapter only to the extent of the retentions and the improper
payments, notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection. Any money
paid by the owner on a direct contract, the payment of which is proved to have
caused no detriment to any certain lienor, shall be held properly paid as to the
lienor, and if any of the money shall be held not properly paid as to any other
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less, the award of attorney's fees was reversed.
Before the lien claimant filed its complaint, the owner offered
to pay the maximum amount to which the claimant was enti-
tled-the ten percent of the original contract price retained by the
owner. The court reasoned that since the lien claimant did not
accept and should have accepted this offer of settlement, it was not
the prevailing party within the meaning of section 713.29 and was
therefore not entitled to attorney's fees. 3'
The offer of settlement precluded the lien claimant from be-
coming the prevailing party in the Monde case because the court
found the litigation unnecessary: success in the foreclosure action
could not have yielded the lien claimant any more than the amount
offered to it by the owner. But in most cases an offer of settlement
does not and should not affect one's status as a prevailing party.
In Peter Marich & Associates, Inc. v. Powell,34 the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a prevailing party is one
in whose favor an affirmative judgment is rendered even though the
judgment is for less than the amount originally sought in the com-
plaint. 325 The court rejected the owner's argument that the lien
claimant was not the prevailing party since it had declined an offer
of judgment before trial.32 6 Although the court recognized that an
offer of judgment should be taken into consideration when deter-
mining attorney's fees, it rejected the argument that the offer of
judgment 'should have been considered by the trial court in deter-
mining who was the prevailing party under section 713.29.2 It is
apparent, therefore, that an offer of settlement or judgment will not
affect the court's determination of the prevailing party except when
the court is confronted with a factual situation similar to the Monde
case.
When a prevailing party is successful on more than one count,
the court must determine the amount of attorney's fees attributable
to the mechanic's lien claim. In Planas & Franyie Engineers, Inc.
v.. Padilla, 32 an owner of property successfully resisted a contractor's
mechanic's lien foreclosure action and breach of contract claim. The
contractor appealed the attorney's fees awarded to the owner as
lienors, the entire benefit of its being held not properly paid as to them shall go
to the lienors.
323. 344 So. 2d at 872.
324. 365 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
325. Id. at 756; accord, Dynamic Builders, Inc. v. Tull, 365 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).
326. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
327. 365 So. 2d at 756 n.1.
328. 341 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
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excessive. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, agreed and
remanded for apportionment of attorney's fees to the lien foreclo-
sure aspect of the case.3" The trial court's apportionment of attor-
ney's fees was sustained on appeal."'
The requirement that attorney's fees be apportioned to a me-
chanic's lien claim was recognized in Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc. 
3
3
In that case the court stated that "[t]he inclusion of any aspect
other than the mechanics' lien foreclosure in arriving at fees taxed
as costs would be an impermissible expansion of the legislative in-
tent contained in the statute."
3 2
Although the statute requires that attorney's fees be awarded
to the prevailing party, the prevailing party must prove that he is
entitled to the amount he seeks. In Leader Mortgage Co. v. Richards
Electric Service, Inc.,33 an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party was reversed on appeal. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, noted that the attorney's fees had been awarded without a
hearing, without testimony and without any affidavits. The court
concluded that under such circumstances the awarding of attorney's
fees was improper .
33
Similarly, in Crystal Properties, Inc. v. Florida Industrial Con-
struction Co., 3 53 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, re-
versed that portion of a judgment awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing party, since no hearing was held on the amount of attor-
ney's fees to which the prevailing party was entitled. The trial
court's award of attorney's fees was presumably based upon an at-
torney's affidavit which had been submitted following the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment. The Second District con-
cluded that, unless the parties agreed to waive the adversary pro-
ceedings otherwise required to determine the amount of a reasona-
ble attorney's fee, awarding attorney's fees on the basis of an attor-
ney's affidavit was reversible error."'
The Leader Mortgage and Crystal Properties cases are instruc-
tive. Affidavits attached to the prevailing party's motion for attor-
ney's fees are insufficient to obtain the fees which section" 713.29
requires to be awarded. A hearing must be held, and the prevailing
party must prove through expert witnesses that the fees sought are
329. Planas & Franyie Eng'rs, Inc. v. Padilla, 310 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
330. 341 So. 2d at 260.
331. 352 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
332. Id. at 947.
333. 348 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
334. Id. at 1205.
335. 350 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (per curiarn).
336. Id. at 363.
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reasonable. 7 Opposing counsel may of course present evidence to
show that the fees sought are unreasonable .
38
B. Arbitration
The existence of a mandatory arbitration clause in a contract
between a lien claimant and the owner will prevent the claimant
from recovering attorney's fees in a suit brought against the owner
to foreclose a lien. In Oakdale Park Ltd. v. Byrd, 339 a subcontractor
brought an action against an owner to foreclose a mechanic's lien
for labor and materials furnished to a construction project. The
owner had a direct contract with the subcontractor which contained
a mandatory arbitration clause. Upon the owner's motion, the trial
court ordered the parties to arbitrate. The lien claimant prevailed
and, in addition, was awarded attorney's fees. The trial court en-
tered an order and the owner appealed the award of attorney's fees.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the award
of attorney's fees to the lien claimant and reaffirmed the holding of
Beach Resorts International, Inc. v. Clarmac Marine Construction
Co. 3 0 The court concluded that awarding attorney's fees to the
claimant would be improper since it was unnecessary for the lien
claimant to initiate the foreclosure action against the owner. "A
party, who has entered into a contract requiring arbitration, may
not flagrantly disregard his contractual prerequisite, march down to
the courthouse, file a complaint of foreclosure, and demand an at-




The Florida Mechanics' Lien Law as originally enacted was
designed to protect the rights of materialmen, laborers and others
who provided services or furnished materials in connection with the
337. If opposing counsel waives a hearing, however, affidavits of other attorneys that the
fees requested are reasonable should be sufficient.
338. 2 S. RAKUSIN, note 75 supra, ch. 19, at 23-24.
339. 346 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
340. 339 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In that case the court stated that "the me-
chanic's lien statute, in cases initiated as lien foreclosures but submitted to mandatory
arbitration, is not operative unless the ju dgment entered confirming, vacating or modifying
the arbitration award must be enforced in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 692.
341. 346 So. 2d at 650. The court did note, however, that if the claimants had sought
redress through the agreed upon arbitration forum but failed to resolve their claim prior to
the expiration of the jurisdictional time for a mechanic's lien foreclosure, then in such event
they would have possessed a right to file the action of foreclosure in order to preserve their
statutory rights.
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improvement of real property. The statute was subject to a rule of
liberal construction "so as to afford the laborers and materialmen
the greatest protection compatible with justice and equity.""3 ' The
scope of protection offered by the statute was interpreted broadly
to include virtually all persons who furnished labor or materials in
connection with the improvement of real property." 3
In 1977, the legislature revised the Mechanics' Lien Law. The
statute is no longer subject to a canon of liberal construction in favor
of the lien claimant 4' and the class of persons afforded protection
by the statute has been limited."5 Nevertheless, the present version
of the statute does provide a workable mechanism through which
materialmen, laborers and others can vindicate their rights. Those.
individuals who seek the protection of the statute, however, must
strictly comply with its terms.
342. Hendry Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 138 Fla. 485, 189 So. 710 (1939).
343. See, e.g., Hey Kiley Man, Inc. v. Azalea Gardens Apts., 333 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA
1976); Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
344. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 15 (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.37 (1977)) which pro-
vides: "This part shall not be subject to a rule of liberal construction in favor of any person
to whom it applies." Id.
345. A lienor was formerly defined as "any person having a lien or prospective lien upon
real property by virtue of this chapter and includes his successor in interest." FLA. STAT. §
713.01(10) (1977). Thus, the Mechanics' Lien Law offered protection to all persons who
furnished labor or materials to an improvement site regardless of the remoteness of their
relationship to the owner.







(e) A materialman who contracts with the owner, a contractor, a subcon-
tractor, or a subsubcontractor, or
(f) A professional lienor under s. 713.03, as each is defined herein, and who
has a lien or prospective lien upon real property under part I, and includes his
successor in interest. No person shall have a lien under part I, except those
specified in this subsection as they are defined in this section.
1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-353, § 1 (emphasis added) (amending FLA. STAT. § 713.01(10) (1977)).
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